384 Journal of the Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies N. 4 / 2014 the greatest, most decisive and undoubtedly revolutionary contribution of the Navy to the joint roadmap was in the littoral region. Why? Because the new technologies (systems C4 and ISTAR, unmanned aircraft systems and submarines, cruise missiles and precision armaments) and the new procedures (network-centric and effects-based operations,25 littoral warfare, dominance of amphibian manoeuvres, precision strikes inland, multidimensional protection or logistics efficiency) would permit the Navy to dominate the entire littoral region. In this sense, the Navy could provide the necessary protection and support (theatre anti-aircraft and anti-missile coverage,26 precision firepower against the enemy defence, forward operational headquarters and command and control capabilities, observation and acquisition of objectives) to guarantee that the joint force could operate freely in the littoral; moreover, its own carrier-battle resources and amphibians would allow them to strike down with great precision any objective situated on the coast or further inland, deploying on firm ground a powerful force capable of facing any rival and carrying out deep strikes against the strategic objectives of the enemy. Nevertheless, this roadmap that Admiral Jay Johnson – Head of Navy Operations between 1996 and 2000 – viewed as the cornerstone of the U.S. naval transformation had a very short life, as just a few months afterwards it was replaced by a new, much more revolutionary work. This decision, possibly due to enormous criticism on the part of analysts over the extreme moderation of the former document,27 and the recommendations of the National Defence Panel brought about the publication 25 Although this work never explicitly mentions network-centric warfare or effects-based operations, there are several references to both ideas. In relation to the networked integration of the fleet, see the following passage: “We take advantage of the reach of our sensors and weapons to project power over vast areas from a dispersed networked force – concentrating combat power rather than our platforms and delivering firepower far inland when required by the mission.” (Ibid., p. 5). And on the capacity of reaching objectives without having to resort to the physical destruction of the adversary, see: “We deliver precision naval fires to accomplish strategic, operational and tactical objectives. Precision means having the desired effects on the enemy, limiting collateral damage, lessening the risk to our forces, and achieving maximum impact with our combat resources.” (Ibid., p. 8). However, while the concept of network-centric warfare was to be introduced a year later into the Navy’s official doctrine, effects-based operations were never employed; probably for organisational reasons, having been an idea developed by the Air Force. Nevertheless, in 2002, the roadmap SeaPower 21 introduced the concept of Effects-Based Striking Power. For more detailed information, COLOM, Guillem: “La evolución de la concepción operativa basada en efectos”, Política y Strategy, nº 117, 2011, pp. 66-88. 26 For information on all aspects relating to theatre missile defence and its role in littoral warfare, see NICKERSON, Brian: Theatre Missile Defense: Operating Forward From the Sea, Maxwell AFB: Air University Press, 1997. 27 DOMBROWSKI, Peter and ROSS, Andrew: Naval Transformation: Prospects and Implications, Boston, American Political Science Association, 2002 or KREPINEVICH, Andrew: National Defense Panel Report: First Shot in the Debate Over Transforming the U.S. Military, Washington DC: Centre for Strategic & Budgetary Assessments, 1997, pp. 5-8.
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