http://revista.ieee.es/index.php/ieee 272 Journal of the Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies Núm. 10 / 2017 “strong evidence” in cases of suspected travel abroad for the purpose of receiving training to commit terrorist attacks, given the impossibility of entering into judicial cooperation with the authorities in Syria to obtain credible evidence of the activities of returnees. Evidence that moreover is able to be classified within different categories of risk to international security: high, moderate and low162. Likewise, Eurojust also insists upon one of the other challenges faced by national competent authorities and that lies in the difficulty of obtaining electronic evidence from other jurisdictions in order to demonstrate support or participation in online terrorist activities, such as the interception of voice communications like Skype or Viber, given the restrictions vis-à-vis data retention and the difficult cross-border cooperation experienced with internet service providers both inside and outside of Europe. In this vein, the Agency has highlighted a series of obstacles and, among these, it mentions: 1. Absence of common legal standards for interceptions of VoIP; 2. The difficulty in identifying IP addresses for communications originating from call shops or Internet Cafes; 3. Gaps in national legislations to criminalise and prosecute as terrorist offences the hosting and administration of a website with terrorism-related material; 4. Lack of harmonisation of laws at EU level in relation to the period of retention of data, which can create difficulties in gathering evidence and judicial cooperation; 5. Obstacles regarding the freezing of a personal account on a social network (e.g. Facebook) when the Internet Service Provider (ISP) is located in a different jurisdiction to the investigation163. However, recognising the progress that has been made and continues to be made not only at legislative, but also at operative, level, counter-terrorism measures at EU level, and more specifically at the level of each Member State, may be considered to be adequate provided that integration and cooperation between Member States becomes as complete as possible. Unfortunately, a great deal remains to be done. CONCLUSIONS Over the course of this essay, the author has highlighted a series of EU measures and instruments implemented with a view to tackling the phenomenon of global terrorism that threatens not only the internal security but also the external security of the region. Just as has been repeatedly mentioned, the EU, as it stands committed to its objective of guaranteeing an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice for its citizens, has opted to combat terrorism and extremist radicalisation by means of a series of measures that can be described as Hard Responses and Soft Responses, designed to create 162 Foreign Fighters: Eurojust’s Views on the Phenomenon and the Criminal Justice Response, p.2. 163 Foreign Fighters: Eurojust’s Views on the Phenomenon and the Criminal Justice Response, p.3.
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