http://revista.ieee.es/index.php/ieee 289 David López Morales Terrae ultima thule: Cooperation in the Artic region not expected to be accessible in the short to medium term. Both the exploitation of the resources and their transportation would remain costly for a considerable period of time46. As Helga Haftendorn has pointed out: “it will take many tens of years to even know what can be exploited; like the Arctic melt itself, it will be a slow process”47. Therefore, the inaccessibility of natural resources and the chances of optimal use of the navigation passages eliminate the possibility of conflict for the time being. Another vital key to understanding why the Arctic States are eager to cooperate is the existence of a favourable international legal framework. The UNCLOS recognises the A-5s’ right to extend their continental shelves, thus guaranteeing them sovereignty over large expanses of maritime territory and, moreover, exclusive access to the natural resources beneath the polar ice cap. It is therefore in the A-5s’ interest to give the impression of a stable, conflict-free region and observe the international framework in order to ensure that they have access to these riches in the future and to prevent other States from accessing the undiscovered natural resources. Finally, scientific uncertainty and the need to have access to the natural resources in a sustainable way have led the Arctic States to cooperate and work together on research, environmental protection and rescue tasks under the auspices of the AC. The AC is a soft law institution, a forum for dialogue and cooperation that was created by declaration. However, it does not have the legal power to deal with security matters, and focuses on what can be defined as low politics. However, it is precisely this soft structure that gives the AC enormous flexibility to adapt to the needs of the A-8. As pointed out in the Interests at stake in the Arctic Region section, it is precisely the elements that make the Arctic a unique region that allow us to identify the factors underlying cooperation. The operationalisation of these factors will be addressed in the following sections. The very rules of the game facilitate cooperation. On this point, it should be stated that our theory contains two dimensions or two problems of analysis that are connected through cooperation. These dimensions will be studied using two different formulas which, in turn, respond to different institutional incentives and different motivations for setting the rules of the game. Let us assume that what we are about to study are two different forms of cooperation and that they are not connected (i.e., one does not lead to the other). We are therefore working with two different perspectives on the same issue: cooperation in the Arctic can be explained, on the one hand, by soft institutions and, on the other, by a a series of common interests and needs and a favourable international legal framework that guarantees peace and stability. 46 ØSTERUD, Øyvind and HØNNELAND, Geir, op. cit., p. 176; STOKKE, Olav Schram, “Environmental Security in the Arctic.” p. 839. 47 HAFTENDORN, Helga, The Case for Arctic Governance: The Arctic Puzzle, Institute of International Affairs, The Centre for Arctic Policy Studies, University of Iceland, 2013, p.7.
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