http://revista.ieee.es/index.php/ieee 331 Anass Gouyez Ben Allal North Korea´s nuclear programe: the survival of the... notifying Seoul, and a hundred of its shells fell beyond the maritime border; South Korea responded by launching howitzers and dispatching combat aircraft. On March 21, 2014, North Korea tested 30 short-range missiles in the Sea of Japan, and a few days later tested two medium-range missiles. These events fostered hostility between the two Koreas. In fact, on March 31, 2014, North Korea and South Korea again exchanged hundreds of artillery shells on the Western Sea border74. In response to the North Korean missile launches, on April 4, 2014, South Korea tested its medium-range missiles which, it declared, were able to reach the greater part of DPRK territory75. And the Government of Pyongyang responded on June 27 of the same year by firing three short-range missiles from its eastern coast 76. On July 11, 2016, the North Korean government issued threats of “physical actions” against South Korea and the United States, on the deployment by the latter of the so-called THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) anti-missile system in the territory of South Korea. This was a new test of ballistic missile technology, in addition to previous nuclear tests carried out by Pyongyang in recent years. As a result of these recurring crises, it is possible to foresee Japan and South Korea developing their own military nuclear programmes, in order to counteract the nuclear threat of North Korea. Both countries may cease to rely on the virtual nuclear deterrence offered by the US umbrella, as it becomes no longer possible to accept that their security depends solely on the effectiveness of their anti-missile systems in the face of the vagaries of the North Korean dictatorial regime77. It is worth noting here that Japan has considerable technological competence in the field of nuclear energy. Nowadays it is one of the great powers in terms of its civil use, with very advanced aerospace and laser technology; therefore, its existing capacity would allow it to manufacture and equip itself with atomic weapons within a very short time. Thus, while in legal terms Japan remains a non-nuclear-weapon state, in technical terms it is virtually capable of possessing nuclear arms. After all, its non-nuclearisation stance is merely a prudent political decision, as it feels comfortable with the current status quo78. 74 See on elmundo.com, published on March 31, 2014, www.elmundo.com/movil/noticia_detalle. php?idx=234575& (consulted on April 15, 2016). 75 See TU noticia, published on April 4, 2014, on www.tunoticiapr.com/noticias-internacionales/ 1362451162-El-Ej%C3%A9rcito-surcoreano-prueba-un-misil-con-el-que-podr% C3%ADa-atacar-a-Corea-del-Norte (consulted on April 16, 2016). 76 See on BBC, published on June 27, 2014, on http://www.bbc.com/mundo/ultimas_ noticias/2014/06/140627_ultnot_corea_norte_misil_men (consulted on 16, April 2016). 77 WODKA-GALLIEN, Philippe, “La Corée du Nord: nouvelle étape vers le statut d’État nucléaire”, Institut Français d’Analyse Stratégique (IFAS), nº 341, 2011, p. 4. 78 MERRA, Michael. Réalités des programmes nucléaires en Asie du Nord-est, Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques (IRIS), Paris, 2009, pp. 2-3.
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