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http://revista.ieee.es/index.php/ieee 335 Anass Gouyez Ben Allal North Korea´s nuclear programe: the survival of the... CONCLUSION North Korea’s nuclear programme is likely to profoundly alter the parameters of the balance of regional security. Regional complexities and the multiplicity of players complicate the situation even further. On the other hand, the interference of international actors fuels these policies and further complicates the situation, thus consolidating the image that the possession of these weapons constitutes a useful guarantee to maintaining security. As we have seen, the threat posed by this nuclear programme is multidimensional, because along with the phenomenon of nuclear proliferation, there are other interrelated epiphenomena or secondary risks that mutually feed off one another. The continuity of the hereditary regime marks the great strategic objective of the DPRK. Since the end of the Cold War, the hermetic nature and the isolation of the North Korean regime have increased. The need to ensure the dynastic transfer of power requires the reinforcement of its defence policy through the development of a nuclear programme; it also requires the generation of periodic crises, requiring a demonstration of the power and prestige necessary to maintain the authority of the regime. Faced with this reality, it is unlikely that sanctions and international pressure, despite their effects on the country, will manage to persuade the Kim regime to abandon its nuclear programme. Notwithstanding, North Korea endeavours to keep negotiations with the United States and the Group of Six on track, on the one hand to benefit from the economic and technical support that serves to maintain its power and, on the other, to build the trust it needs from international society and make progress with its nuclear programme. Affirming itself as an increasingly credible nuclear and ballistic power, Pyongyang is playing a dangerous game that could, in short, enable it to finally achieve what the regime desperately hoped for in the 1950s: a place in the “Concert of Nations”, a role of power that guarantees the survival of his regime. With its fifth nuclear test, North Korea wanted to show the world that it has mastered the required technology for the manufacture of nuclear warheads and launch vectors. For its adversaries and its allies alike, the case of North Korea is a problem. The road to negotiation and the means of coercion are limited by the rapid advance of the North Korean nuclear and ballistic programme. The development of the latter offers a more favourable negotiating position, as it makes it more difficult to return to the status quo. This reality poses a huge challenge for the international community. The question now is how to convince North Korea to “denuclearise” given that it has already registered its nuclear power status in its Constitution and proclaims its willingness to use nuclear weapons should its sovereignty be threatened.


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