Journal of the Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies Núm. 10 / 2017 http://revista.ieee.es/index.php/ieee 352 “Those who study theoretical jihad, meaning they study only jihad as it is written on paper, will never grasp this point well. Regrettably, the youth in our Umma44, since the time when they were stripped of weapons, no longer understand the nature of wars. One who previously engaged in jihad knows that it is naught but violence, crudeness, terrorism, frightening (others), and massacring – I am talking about jihad and fighting, not about Islam and one should not confuse them”45. From there, it is clear to see new forms of leadership and new models of behaviour that make the martyr and the jihadist a model empty of meaning46: “Some forms of worship of the dead are also transcendent. Modern heroes are ephemeral and sometimes virtual; in a post-heroic society like today’s, they are at times mere shells behind which there is absolutely nothing, what is known and accepted without, paradoxically, thereby ceasing to be a reference of supposed virtues, even in death”47. Today’s global jihadist movement is barely, or not at all, religious. While it is true that in the case of al-Qaeda, religion and politics intermingled as aims and final destinations, the same cannot be said of the Islamic State. Osama bin Laden, like Ayman al-Zawahiri, didn’t hesitate to use violence and even to turn it into a propaganda tool, but his messages, his speeches, his metanarrative and his objectives were clearly political, heirs to Qutbism) inspired by a radical version of the Islamic religion. For their part, the followers of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi have a clear political objective legitimised by religion. Jihadism in Syria and Iraq, just as in some parts of Africa, 44 Global Community of Muslim believers. A type of transnational identity construction that encompasses all those who embrace Islam independently of any other identity criteria (gender, nationality, race, etc.). 45 NAJI, Abu Bakr. The Management of Savagery. Translated by William McCants. Cambridge, Massachusetts (United States): John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies (Harvard University), 2006. 46 This could be due to the fact that in the modern world, anything that at any time conjured up a task – a cause, ultimately a why – had lost its authority. It was, as Heidegger stated, an inability by the movements and the causes to request the support and its continuity from the individual. Life stopped having a meaning because the public world was lacking scripts and lines; the modern human being had the power to generate his own values though himself. SeeHeidegger, Martin. Nietzsche. Translated by Juan Luis Vermal. Barcelona: Ediciones Destino S.A., 2000. 47 AZNAR FERNÁNDEZ-MONTESINOS, Federico. «Reflexiones y debates sobre violencia organizada y economía.» (Analysis Document)Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos, 9 September 2014, https://www.google.es/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ah UKEwjqiYiTmejSAhXB8RQKHausDo8QFggcMAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ieee. es%2FGalerias%2Ffichero%2Fdocs_analisis%2F2014%2FDIEEEA45-2014_ReflexionesViolencia_ Economia_FAFM.pdf&usg=AFQjCNGVfBmnIuRiYiWEnZifXbTgiCjrnA&sig2=ofa_ X3IkJ2ZjQB7ZLrUq6Q. (last consulted 20.03.2017).
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