225 Chema Suárez Serrano Journalism in the armed conflict of the 21st century:... Practising journalism in these contexts is very complicated due to the inherent difficulty of reporting on complex variable conflicts, which are often invisible, unde-clared, unrecognised by the parties or bloodless. The way (militarily, legally, by hu-manitarian means and, of course, with journalism) of tackling new types of threats is still evolving and requires adapting66 whilst there is a purge of the common practices used to poison public opinion, primarily propaganda.67 Journalism of the 21st century screens out journalists as it demands more of them in terms of training and capability. They must adapt their skills to match up with what is expected of them: Reporting is a vital function to the defence of freedom of expression, citizens’rights and democracy, according to the European Court of Human Rights.68 Yet in contemporary armed conflict, the first military operation (and sometimes the last one) is one of information.69 It is precisely due to its effect on public opinion70 that it may also be utilised as a method of combat, thereby losing its value as a peacemaker. This is not journalism, although parties interested in spreading their version of events will use the same formats with a view to confusing the population, aware that control over information is an essential advantage, which on many occasions proves decisive. Dominating the media sphere with a predominance of favourable messages grants a party an extraordinary advantage not only in terms of crushing the morale of an enemy, but also to direct public opinion towards its own cause. Communication is a matter of military interest, its correct management represents an advantage that may change the course of destiny of a conflict, or even avoid it altogether if managed in the right way. If hostilities flare up, victory also depends on the proper use of infor-mation and public opinion, and not only on what occurs at a strictly military level,71 as was the case until last century. Even at the Paris Conference (1973) that brought the Vietnam War to a close, the Asian delegation unequivocally recognised the military victory of the North-American army in front of its Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, even though they considered it irrelevant. In fact, the Vietnamese were pleased about the defeat inflicted on their powerful rival in the media and in international public opinion,72 which turned them into the de facto victors in the face of an opponent that 66 GARCÍA CASES M. «Terrorismo y guerra convencional: El conflicto híbrido. La experiencia de Líbano de 2006». Actas III Jornadas estudios de seguridad. Instituto Universitario General Gutiérrez Mellado. Madrid, 2011, pp.1051-1064. http://iugm.es/uploads/tx_iugm/IUGM_ACTAS_III_JORNADAS_EST_DE_SEGURI-DAD. http://revista.ieee.es/index.php/ieee pdf 67 DETTER, I. The Law of War, Cambridge University Press. 2002, p. 49. 68 Sentence of the ECHR Case of Handyside v. The United Kingdom. 7 December 1976, par. 49. http:// hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-57499 69 EILDERS, C., «Media under fire: Fact and fiction in conditions of war». International Review of the Red Cross, 31 December 2005. https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/article/review/review-860-p639.htm. 70 A/RES/69/185 11 February 2015. http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/69/185. 71 PAYNE, K. «The media as an instrument of war». Parameters, United Stated Army War College. Spring 2005, p. 81. http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/Articles/05spring/payne.pdf 72 SUMMERS H.G. On strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War. Novato, California, USA, Presidio Press, 1982.
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