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295 Josep Baqués Quesada Fundamental lessons in the work of Mahan: from… policy. Nations that seek to obtain this status of great power, especially if it includes hegemonic claims, must act accordingly. There are no shortcuts. But that means having a vision of the future, understood as a state policy51, in addition to avoiding quite a few pitfalls. Again, his praise is directed to certain master lines that governed the construction of the British Empire. For example, the way in which they handled the question of Gibraltar in the Utrecht Treaty (no less than the way in which they successfully disputed New York with the Dutch or Ceylon, or the French in Canada); support for their Company of the Indies, in competition with the Dutch and to the detriment of the Belgian and Danish attempts to do the same; or the deployment of the Royal Navy, in virtually all latitudes, to lend credibility to a project of such magnitude... all of which implied weaving an impressive network of naval bases. In terms of concepts, this is not strictly speaking geographical determinism either, since it involves political decision-making and establishing priorities, far beyond the initial geographical tyranny inferable from the initial location of each power with global aspirations52. They are all policies that deserve Mahan’s applause, although they promote a race between powers that is not without risk53. The key lies in expanding the control of the main routes of passage, straits, estuaries and naval stations (especially at the expense of a direct competitor) even when that means neglecting a terrestrial front54. Some authors indicate that with his theory, Mahan defends colonialism55. Mahan was aware that supremacy at sea was achieved in this way in the past. But we know that what Mahan’s model demands is achieving the facilities to establish naval bases 51  LÓPEZ, José Ignacio. «Una visión de futuro: la geopolítica de Alfred Mahan», Revista Universidad Eafit, Vol. 29, n.º 91, Medellín, 1993, p. 74. 52  We recall the phrase that Mahan attributes to Napoleon, commenting on the British bid to control the naval base of Valletta: «I would have preferred to see the English on the hills of Montmartre than in Malta» (MAHAN, Alfred. 1897, op. cit., p. 24). 53  TERZAGO, Jorge. 2006, op. cit., p. 48. 54  One of the main (and recurrent) criticisms launched by Mahan against Louis XIV has to do with the Sun King’s poor management in the English Revolution of 1688 in not impeding the arrival of the Protestant William of Orange with his fleet, and, even worse, his failure to disembark in Ireland in support of the Catholic James II, who was finally defeated (MAHAN, op.cit., 2007, pp. 230-231). Later on, he demonstrates how the French navy went into decline at the end of the seventeenth century, which would be followed by the decline of France as such, suffering an «exhaustion» caused by «the excessive expenses of the continental war» (idem: p. 243). Something similar arises in the case of Spain, given the enormous wear and tear that meant keeping the «Spanish road» open to the Netherlands (idem, p. 109). In general, Mahan criticises the Spanish policy of tolerating its Empire having been left without a navy adapted to its needs... 55  HICKEN, Victor. U.S. History. People Who Helped Make the Republic Great. 1620-Present. Carson- Dellosa Publishing Co, 2006, p. 78; y ADAMS, John A. If Mahan Ran the Great Pacific War. Indiana University Press, 2008, p. 3. http://revista.ieee.es

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