Revista del Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos n.º 12 - Año: 2018 - Págs.: 273 a 298 283 Enrique Arias Gil The future of nuclear terrorism in individual terrorist... l) As suitable locations for attacks, Breivik cites Western European capitals, particularly inner city tourist attractions and popular locations of symbo-lic value to ‘cause maximum ideological, psychological and economical damage’39. The radiological or nuclear route would undoubtedly be the most likely way an individual terrorist would attempt an attack because it requires only basic knowledge of bomb-making, or none at all if the terrorist looks for other methods of dispersal. It would also be an economical attack for the terrorist and the only difficulty they would encounter would be the acquisition of radioactive material, where an insider, opportunism or illegal trafficking would undoubtedly play a key role. If, in addition, we consider the narcissistic personality of most lone wolves, not unlike that of mass murderers and school killers, it becomes apparent that an attack of these characteris-tics would be a perfect means of attaining the public and media attention that most individuals who pursue terrorist tactics and strategies crave. Attack on a nuclear facility Nuclear facilities are an attractive target for terrorists because of their potential to strike fear into the public, a fear they would always be tempted to exploit40. In the event of an attempted attack on a nuclear facility, terrorists could choose as a target a nuclear power plant, reprocessing plant, research reactor, radioactive waste storage facility41 or a fuel assembly plant. However, Spanish army operations analyst Julio Or-tega García believes it would not make sense for a terrorist group to attack a nuclear facility unless it were a nuclear power plant, because terrorists would not pursue such a ‘limited target’42. As Martín Corrales has pointed out, an attack on a nuclear power plant could cause a radioactive leak, ‘leading to a large-scale nuclear disaster with devastating environ-mental, human and economic consequences’. If the spent fuel pools were destroyed, radioactive substances could be released into the atmosphere and if, in addition, the terrorists were able to sabotage the reactor core and cause it to overheat, it could melt. Nevertheless, to achieve this, ‘the terrorists would not only have to be able to successfully attack certain systems (....), but also destroy (at least in part) the con-tainment building in order to disperse some of the reactor fuel’. The most vulnerable facilities, adds Corrales, would be ‘nuclear reactors that do not have a containment building, such as the Soviet-designed RBMK and VVER reactors and those designed 39 Ibid., pp. 1062-1063. 40 See Corrales, op. cit., p. 28. 41 Ibid., p. 19. 42 Ortega García, Julio. Medidas de Defensa en España frente al terrorismo nuclear. Documento Marco IEEE, no. 05/2013., p. 14.
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