406 Journal of the Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies Núm. 12 / 2018 While the main emerging geopolitical powers are increasing their military capabi-lities, other states are investing in space technology, although in most cases they are civil rather than military. Due to size constraints, this article will focus on the study and analysis of the Asian continent as outlined in the previous section. Navigation and space positioning systems represent one of the most illustrative cases of the new multi-polar space age. In addition to the two systems in operation to date, the North American GPS and the Russian GLONASS, two other indepen-dent systems can be added: the European navigation systems Galileo and the Chinese BeiDou. It is expected that the 35 BeiDou satellites will provide global services upon completion in 2020. However, multipolarity means that advances are being made elsewhere outside of China. India and Japan also have also aspirations to acquire in-digenous and independent navigation systems: the former, through the IRNSS (In-dian Regional Navigation Satellite System), a system composed of seven satellites of regional scope covering the subcontinent; and the latter, with the development of the QZSS (Quazi-Zenith Satellite System), a four-satellite navigator in highly elliptical orbit (HEO) designed to provide regional coverage over Japan, the Korean Peninsula and the Yellow Sea. The reasons driving states to achieve independent navigation sys-tems are clear: on the one hand, to distance themselves from GPS-dependence and on the other, to ensure against a lack of access to their services in a crisis context.35 Given that studies in space policy tend to focus primarily on the capabilities of the two main Asian powers, China and India, this article will undertake a review of the space capabilities of other actors on the Asian continent. In the Middle East, Iran became the first Islamic nation and the ninth worldwide to reach the status of space power after the launch of its domestically-made Omid satellite using the Safir-2 launch system, of the Shabab missile class, in February 2009. Although Iran has argued that its space programme is exclusively for civil and peaceful purposes, the West harbours suspicions that it is a dual and clandestine programme whose ultimate objective is the development of long-range missiles. However, irrespective of Iranian military intentions, its space programme is viewed to be both an attempt to gain international prestige and a technological demonstra-tion of potential ballistic missile capabilities: since then, Iran has offered to provide assistance to other Muslim countries who want to establish a space programme;36 its national pride and the Islamic regime have been strengthened as a consequence and with its techno-logical development it aspires to achieving greater political presence in the region.37 35 Jaramillo, C., Space Security Index 2013, Tenth edition, Ontario: Space Security.org, 2013, pp. 41-42. 36 Chow, T., “Iranian Space Launch Capabilities. Fact Sheet”, Secure World Foundation, 2 September 2010, <http://swfound.org/media/1690/swf_iran_slv_fact_sheet.pdf> consulted: 15-9-2018. 37 Hsu, J., “Iran’s Space Program: Lots of Talk, but a Chance to Shine”, Space.com, 9 November 2010, <http://www.space.com/9499-iran-space-program-lots-talk-chance-shine.html> consulted: 15-9-2018. Revista del Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos n.º 12 - Año: 2018 - Págs.: 397 a 431
Revista_IEEE_12
To see the actual publication please follow the link above