191 Palmerino Cuneo Terrorism and organised crime: The system of “permanent… The religious factor does not come into play on its own. Instead, it is accompanied by tribal or ethnic divisions and rivalries (such as the Tuareg rebellion in Mali in 2012, the uprising of the Kanuri community in the northeast of Nigeria which was subsequently absorbed by Boko Haram29, and the “ethnic” conflicts in the two Sudans), and gener-ally combines with financial factors30 and the fight over their control. Thus, rather than a “holy war” on the Western World31, this is a series of intra-Islamic civil wars against their own regimes and in the name of a political form of Islam, where powerful actors from the Gulf area are involved (Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Iran32) who, at the same time, determine the balances of the multipolar order that extends across the Sahel. The socio-political vacuum of the Sahel has been filled by a jihadist movement that seems to have very little to do with Islam, because terrorism is a transnational move-ment of strategic relevance and with a political purpose. Although it casts its ideology around a religious and monotheistic framework, the connection is rather loose. Pol-itics and religion in Islamic culture are difficult to separate, and the reawakening of seditious political contestation under the totem of religious identity as a legitimising source of rulemaking33 has brought old internal and local rivalries to the fore, drawing other countries and non-state actors into the quarrel who hope to capitalise on the situation through alliances. The goal of these terrorist organisations, in accordance with Gourdin34, is to im-pose a new model of society, taking over control of these safe havens as the epicentre of the Islamic reconquest. It is therefore a profoundly political problem, inasmuch as these seditious movements of radical Islamic bias are strengthened by the ease of mobilising their “warriors” and by the high profitability derived from the networks of organised crime. With their loose connections to Al Qaeda or ISIS, they become globalised and turn into fundamental tools when it comes to determining the new multipolar balances. The threat is of a complex nature, and the underlying mecha- 29 We shall continue calling it that, although since 2015 its leader Abu Bakr Shekau, in his loyalty oath to the self-proclaimed “Caliph” Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi of ISIS, referred to it as “Wilayat al Sudan al Gharbi” (States of Western Sudan) which has also been named Wilāyat West Ifrīqiyyah (States of West Africa) in ISIS’ digital English language publication “Dabiq”. Available at: https://goo.gl/sZby8Y (consulted on: 3 May 2018). 30 KEATINGE, Tom. “Black Market. How the charcoal trade fuels Al Shabab”, Foreign Affairs, 18 November 2014. Available at: https://goo.gl/5ypRGo (consulted on: 2 May 2018). 31 And while Al Bagdadi at least has some academic credentials in Islamic theology, despite having destroyed the great Al Nuri mosque where he proclaimed himself caliph, none of the exponents or leaders of these movements can attribute themselves an Islamic mandate allowing them to speak and act in the name of Islam (see NÚÑEZ, VILLAVERDE, Jesús. op. cit., 2018, p.14). 32 For this, see CICCIOMESSERE, Roberto. “Terrorismo islamico: la vera guerra non è in Europa”, Strade on line, 2 August 2016. Available at: https://goo.gl/Auu8z5 (consulted on: 4 May 2018). 33 DEMMERS, Jolle. Theories of Violent Conflict: An Introduction. London: Routledge, 2012, p.8. 34 GOURDIN, Patrice. «Al-Qaida au Maghreb Islamique (AQMI) », Question Internationales, n.58, 2012, p.19. Revista del Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos n.º 13 - Año: 2019 - Págs.: 181 a 212
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