193 Palmerino Cuneo Terrorism and organised crime: The system of “permanent… ment38.The panoply of denominations and acronyms found across the Sahel has been catalogued by observers who at times are drawn into simplifying the international brands of terror; and while it is true that the stronger brands work and everybody has an interest in tagging onto them, on the other hand it is worth noting that each group ties its origins and interests to its birth territory. The dynamic expansion of the jihadist presence across the whole Sahel39 and its dichotomous reordering has not entailed an increase in the number of jihadist groups, but a series of excisions and loyalty switches motivated by personal and local agendas. Essentially, it is “much more a case of fragmentation of jihadism … than a rise of its numbers.”40 Moreover, these two organisations are currently undergoing a process of structural and strategic convergence41, and it is not on this dichotomy that the focus of the response should be targeted, but on its structural causes explaining the synergy between jihadism and violence42. 38 Both pursue the same objectives (unification of the umma, imposition of the sharia, and reconstitution of the Caliphate, a return to the unity, purity and greatness of Islam), however, at least initially, they differ in terms of structures and tactics in the short and medium term. While ISIS has embedded itself in contexts where local populations are strongly rooted in their territory and defend their claims of autonomy and independence from the central government through jihad, in regions where the territorial factor and direct administration is culturally weaker, the loosely-woven network model encouraged by Al Qaeda prevails. 39 This is no longer limited to the north of Mali (Azawad). Al Qaeda, through the JNIM, is establishing itself in places where its presence was hitherto intermittent, for example in the centre of Mali, the desert of Mauritania and the western provinces of Niger. Or Burkina Faso, which had not been faced with jihadism until a couple of years ago. At the same time, ISIS is trying to link its branches in Libya to Boko Haram by adhering minority groups such as the “remains” of the MUJAO, commanded by Abu Walid Al Sahrawi. See: https://goo.gl/qENTPo. (Consulted on: 5 May 2018). 40 NÚÑEZ, VILLAVERDE, Jesús. Op. cit., 2018, p.41. 41 ISIS, following its defeats in Iraq and Syria and on seeing its funding and recruitment compromised, has for the time being changed strategies, increasing and focussing its attacks on more specific targets in the West, too, while using more typically terrorist approaches. The point is to show that it has survived and only delays its achievements (MARTIN, Javier. Estado Islámico, geopolítica del caos. Madrid: Catarata, 2017, p.146). On the other hand, Al Qaeda has evolved, conquering territories and being able to rely not only on networks of terrorist cells but also groups of militias with a military organisation (see: https://goo.gl/UPYKSz, and https://goo.gl/FsssFF - consulted on: 4 May 2018). Before the French intervention in 2012, its organisation in Mali was a genuine occupying army, almost a proto-state controlling the north of Mali, delivering services to the local population. Similarly to ISIS’ recent tactical change, its defeat provoked a change to urban guerrilla tactics, bombs, suicide attacks and terrorism (ROLET, Hélène. “L’armée française à l’épreuve de la guerre hybride dans le Sahel”, Revue Défense Nationale, n. 765, 2016, pp.1-5), in addition to redefining the strategic southwestern axis (Belmoktar’s domain). 42 Hence, the “balkanisation” of the region does not seem to be a convincing strategic objective, apart from rendering the tangible creation of a universal caliphate impossible: the seditious objective of the jihad of unifying the Arab world through civil wars seems to be more local rather than international (CAMPANINI, Massimo. “L’islamismo jihadista da Al-Quaeda all’IS”, Rivista dell’Istituto Studi Politica Internazionale, Documento de Analisis n.290, Rome, 2015, p.14). Revista del Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos n.º 13 - Año: 2019 - Págs.: 181 a 212
Revista_IEEE_13
To see the actual publication please follow the link above