201 Palmerino Cuneo Terrorism and organised crime: The system of “permanent… the strategies of adaptation between the sphere of gain and the symbolic dimension of power75. The actual change of structure of the terrorist organisation converges towards a structural model of organised crime and, as pointed out by Sánchez y Yubero76, “if originally Al Qaeda opted for the construction of a pyramidal model, currently both Al Qaeda and ISIS are opting for a network-based structure which is characteristic of criminal organisations”. It is difficult to determine whether it is the organised crime model that is shaping the kind of terrorist activity or whether it is terrorism choos-ing how to finance itself. What is certain, however, is that the most important factor behind the explosion of terrorist power in the Sahel is its interconnection to transna-tional crime, which one might call its raison d’être77. On top of “institutional” financing78, the control of the desert highways allows them to take part in this “economy of terror” through trafficking of drugs, arms, oil79, precious stones, medicine80, wildlife and ivory81, in addition to human trafficking82 75 WANG, Peng. ”The Crime-Terror Nexus: Transformation, Alliance, Convergence”, Asian Social Science, vol.6, n.6, 2011, pp.11-20. This perspective could warrant a closer look — given the proven liaison between the FARC and ETA — into the coincidence of the gradual ending of ETA hostilities and the switching of Central and South American drug traffic routes from the Iberian Peninsula to West Africa. 76 SÁNCHEZ, Verónica and YUBERO, Beatriz. “Influencia de las redes criminales de carácter transnacional en los conflictos”, Centro Superior de Estudios de la Defensa Nacional (CESEDEN), Documento de trabajo n.12, Madrid, 2016, p.12. Available at: https://goo.gl/UP3T6z (consulted on: 24 April 2018). 77 See White House report “Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime” of July 2011 (in: https://goo.gl/AX4f2S - consulted on: 3 May 2018) and the report for the US Congress “Terrorism and Transnational Crime: Foreign Policy Issues for Congress” of June 2013 (in: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/ R41004.pdf - consulted on: 3 May 2018). 78 As donations from supporters (state or non-state) are based on zakat (alms), in order to sidestep controls the zakat are channelled through the hawala (“trust remittance”), i.e. transfers based on a person’s word and using intermediary companies. Another option is plain crowdfunding via social networks or international prepaid cards (en BALLESTEROS, MARTÍN, Miguel, Ángel. Op. cit, 2017, pp.133-136). 79 In 2017 the Atlantic Council estimated the annual value of the illicit oil trade in Nigeria between 3 and 8 billion dollars. The local ISIS affiliate, Boko Haram, influences the Nigerian economy. Nigeria displays its support for the Irananian model and is not aligned with Riyadh, especially where the supply policy for oil is concerned. For the same reason, ISIS has decided to invest in Libya rather than Yemen, to continue building up its stakes in oil smuggling, which it has consolidated in Syria and Iraq (in: http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/publications/reports/downstream-oil-theft - consulted on: 2 May 2018). 80 In: http://www.africafundacion.org/spip.php?article29314. 81 See joint report from UNEP and INTERPOL of 2014 “The Environmental Crime Crisis”, which examines organisations operating in the Darfur civil war and pinpoints Boko Haram, Al Shaabab and the government-friendly militia group Janjaweed as those who profit the most from this trade (in: https://www.cbd.int/financial/monterreytradetech/unep-illegaltrade.pdf - consulted on: 2 May 2018). 82 See report by Africa Center for Strategic Studies, The Illicit Superhighway: Transnational Organized Crime in Africa, 22 May 2017 (Available at: https://goo.gl/7MB5Fo - consulted on: 4 May 2018). Revista del Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos n.º 13 - Año: 2019 - Págs.: 181 a 212
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