206 Journal of the Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies Núm. 13 / 2019 of globalisation have never reached and mutual dependence is still highly asymmetri-cal. Under this emblem, subversion is proposed as a socio-political alternative to the elites of these rentier states or to the anti-Sunni, pro-Western regimes, or those domi-nated by a particular ethnic group, or whatever the combination of local elements that sustain this hazy amalgam of political, social and/or economic grievances. This leads us to consider jihadism as a local threat104, where its action, albeit legit-imised by a final universal objective — such as the caliphate, the umma and the fight against a Western oppressor —, is always localised and geared towards the struggle for local political power. Hence, the answer is to be found in the local political and socio-cultural context105. A local jihad, under whichever terrorist brand, would find its strict hybridisation with organised crime justified, with which it shares objectives and methods, offering itself in a symbiotic way as an “emerging political complex” or a new way of managing power in the territories it controls, thereby providing some form of legitimisation to the population. In a parallel way, if this nexus manifests itself as a “Mafia-system” in the West, in the Sahel where sovereignty is “limited” or hybrid, more extreme phenomena of insurgence and terrorism proliferate, using violence to implement de facto non-state political authoritarianism. This striving of organised crime is an instrument of at-tack in the political arena which coincides with the radical political movements that are seeking alternative socio-political control under the banner of political Islam. In the Sahel, every single route is subject to this union, and by incentivising instability, the proliferation of terrorist organisations along the old desert highways from Libya to Nigeria constitutes an indispensable territorial nexus for transnational organised crime106; both share an equal interest in permanent conflict and its corollary of thriv-ing economic ventures107: a true hybridisation where armed violence participates both in the criminal and in the political objectives108. Therefore, rather than letting oneself be guided by categorisations, groupings of brands, contingent alliances or internal struggles around the universal leadership of 104 As Núñez Villaverde highlights: “each group has its own agenda and plans for a specific territory and it would be wrong to say that each of their actions relates to an order received from somewhere …”. (NÚÑEZ, VILLAVERDE, Jesús. Op. cit., 2018, p.42). 105 ROSEMBLATT, Nate. “All Jihad is local: What ISIS’ Files Tell Us About Its Fighters”, New America, 20 July 2016, p.34. Available at: https://goo.gl/hsddY3 (consulted on: 1 May 2018). The author underlines that the key to the dilemma is to be found at local and territorial level, as shown by the rapid success of the ISIS brand. 106 GARZÓN, Juan, Carlos et al. La diáspora criminal. La difusión transnacional del Crimen Organizado y como contener su expansión. Washington: Wilson Center, 2013. 107 DE LA CORTE, Luis. op. cit., 2014, pp.20-21. 108 The formation of MUJAO from AQMI is a case in point where a balance seems to have been attained between a local network of local criminals and breakaway AQMI militia members (See SÁNCHEZ, Verónica y YUBERO, Beatriz. Op. cit., 2016, p.26). Revista del Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos n.º 13 - Año: 2019 - Págs.: 181 a 212
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