342 Journal of the Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies N. 4 / 2014 of another important al Qaeda operative in Gujrat (Punjab), the Tanzanian Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani, wanted for his connection with the terrorist attacks in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998. In May 2005, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed’s successor within al Qaeda, Abu Faraj al-Libbi, was captured in Mardan (Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa).68 In December, the latter’s successor, Abu Hamza Rabia, was killed in a U.S. drone attack in North Waziristan.69 And these were just the first of many al Qaeda “number threes” eliminated in Pakistan. While it is not clear whether these had had contact with Zawahiri or Osama bin Laden, Libbi’s capture appears to have provided the first clues that led to the discovery and subsequent death of bin Laden in 2011.70 The case of Noor Mohammed Khan is a curious one in that he was released without being charged in 2007.71 It so happens that the lawyer who represented Khan was Babar Awan, senator and finance secretary of the Pakistan People’s Party, the party in power at the time. The fact that such a prominent figure handled Khan’s case suggests that there may have been an institutional interest in his release, or it may have been in exchange for his collaboration while under arrest. Following 9/11 and the loss of the original al Qaeda’s safe haven in Afghanistan, jihad groups using the al Qaeda name began to emerge in other parts of the world. The first of these al Qaeda “franchises” was al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), which emerged in 2003.72 It was followed by al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia or al-Qaeda in Iraq, led by the Jordanian al-Zarqawi and the only “franchise” that was officially recognised by bin Laden. Later on, there was al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), which was formed after the merging of several groups, including the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), the Algerian 68 When writing this article, Libbi was still being held prisoner in the U.S. prison Guantanamo. See the New York Times project, the Guantanamo Docket, at http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo/ detainees/10017-abu-faraj-al-libi, accessed on 11 March 2014. 69 The same attack killed Amer Azizi, a member until 2001 of the Spanish branch of al Qaeda led by Abu Dahdah, the main link between the Madrid Train Bombings and the al Qaeda organisation, REINARES, 2014, pp.127-143. 70 FINN, Peter and KORNBLUT, Anne E., “Al-Qaeda couriers provided trail that led to bin Laden”, The Washington Post, 2 May 2011. 71 HASAN, Syed Shoaib, “Pakistan’s Extraordinary Prisoner”, BBC News, 21 August 2007. 72 Bin Laden’s role in this organisation appears to have been confined to that of moral advisor, and he had no say in the group’s decision-making. Even in this capacity, he does not appear to have exerted much influence, as evidenced by the letter he himself, or `Atiyya, the leader of AQAP, wrote recommending that the organisation focus on the fight against the U.S. and not attack Yemini security forces. In practice, AQAP activity in Yemen goes completely against this advice, see SOCOM-2012- 0000016-HT, “Letter to Nasir al-Wuhayshi”, p.5.
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