343 Carlos Setas Vílchez What are we talking about when we talk about al- Qaeda? Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC),73 and the Somalian group Al-Shabab,74 sometimes called al-Qaeda in the Horn of Africa.75 Given the great many groups that were using the al Qaeda “trademark”, Western media and academia began to use the term al Qaeda Central (AQC) to refer to the central command of the original organisation in Pakistan. This name often implied that AQC had a degree of control or leadership over the other groups using its name, which in hindsight appears to have been far from reality. All too often, the organisation created and directed by bin Laden has been identified with its regional namesakes, and there has also been a tendency to exaggerate and magnify its threat. Curiously enough, Osama bin Laden himself, in one of the documents he wrote that was seized in Abbottabad and made available to the public, accepts the name al Qaeda Central, which he claimed was coined by the media. He believed that the term was useful for drawing a distinction between al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan and al Qaeda in other regions.76 It is apparent from the documents seized in Abbottabad and Fadil Harun’s autobiography77 that al Qaeda Central had no operational control whatsoever over the “franchises”. In view of the ideology of the original al Qaeda, which we looked at earlier, it is hard to consider the franchises as an extension of the organisation, primarily because the objectives of all these organisations have a marked regional or local component, in contrast to the contempt al Qaeda had for regionalism. It can be deduced from the documents that were seized that Bin Laden was aiming to revitalise his organisation and regain its central role in the jihadist conglomerate. It is possible that he wanted al Qaeda to play the central role in the jihad and was therefore drafting a framework document laying down the rules of conduct for groups wishing to use his “trademark”. Bin Laden may have been trying to take advantage of a situation beyond his control and centralise global jihad activity in al Qaeda.78 His 73 At the start, both the GSPC, which came from the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), and the LIFG had individuals who had fought in the Afghan jihad. 74 With regard to al-Shabab, of special interest is the letter from Osama bin Laden to the group’s leader, Mukhtar Abu al-Zubayr, in which the former politely turns down the Somali’s request to become part of al Qaeda. Al-Shabab was eventually accepted into the organisation by Ayman al- Zawahiri after the death of bin Laden. See SOCOM-2012-0000005-HT. 75 LAHOUD, N., CAUDILL, S., COLLINS, L., KOEHLER-DERRICK, G., RASSLER, D., AL- ‘UBAYDI, M., 2012. 76 SOCOM-2012-0000019-HT, “Letter from UBL to Atiyatullah al-Libi 4” p.17. 77 The English translations of the “Abbottabad Documents” are available at http://www.ctc.usma. edu/posts/publications/harmony-documents. With regard to Harun’s testimony, it should be taken into account that, according to Harun himself, he lost contact with the organisation in Pakistan after 2003. 78 LAHOUD, N., CAUDILL, S., COLLINS, L., KOEHLER-DERRICK, G., RASSLER, D., AL-
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