379 Guillem Colom Piella Defining the US Navy in the 21st Century response, this white paper demonstrated that the Navy that emerged from the Cold War –with an imposing oceanic fleet, a formidable submarine weaponry, a powerful marine infantry and an efficient support force– could not only carry out these duties very effectively; but was highly capacitated for forward presence and crisis response thanks to its carrier-battle and amphibious-ready groups capable of providing a broad range of responses to any eventuality. However, From the Sea also deemed it necessary to make some adjustments in force structure, materiel and operational concepts, with the following goals: • To increase the deployment capacity and sustainability of the Navy so as to reinforce its expeditionary vocation, by modernising strategic transport, integrating logistics and anticipating materiel. • To carry out joint operations as a way of power projection on the coast and control of the littoral region9 via the implementation of a joint doctrine, the improvement of capabilities command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, observation, acquisition of objectives and reconnaissance (C4ISTAR), adapting existing material means and the acquisition of new systems optimised for these new tasks.10 • To project naval power on land, strengthening the capacity for land strikes by onboard aircraft, the increased arsenal for naval and submarine-launched cruise missiles, the acquisition of new precision arms and the strengthening of the Marine Corps. Two years later, the Navy Chiefs of Staff presented Forward…From the Sea, which developed the thesis of the previous work. Basing itself on the 1993 Bottom-Up Review and the 1994 National Security Strategy11 – which definitively disregarded the Soviet threat, confirmed the new regional approach and put forward as a major 9 Bear in mind that the bulk of world’s population, interests, maritime traffic, piracy and contraband are concentrated along coastlines. A more detailed analysis of this strategic reality and of the reasons why the Navy should focus its efforts towards littoral warfare can be found in: MUNDI, Carl: “Thunder and Lightning: Joint Littoral Warfare”, Joint Forces Quarterly, nº 5, 1994, pp. 45-50. 10 Although the so-called Anti-Access and Area-Denial strategies, which are currently giving rise to so many fears, had not been defined, the document warns that the naval troops operating in the littoral region will have to face a varied range of measures (cruise and ballistic missiles, marine mines, submarines, terrorist attacks, etc.) designed to obstruct or impede the approach of American troops to the coast. 11 The 1994 National Security Strategy formalised the political doctrine of “engagement & enlargement” that guided U.S. external action during President Clinton’s first mandate. For more details on the objectives outlined by this work and the enormous differences compared to the last work of the Bush Administration (1988-92), see SNIDER, Don: Strategy, Forces and Budgets: Dominant Influences in Executive Decision Making, Post-Cold War 1989-91, Carlisle Barracks, U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute, 1993, pp. 9-11.
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