380 Journal of the Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies N. 4 / 2014 threat the possible outbreak of a regional conflict anywhere on the globe requiring a rapid and decisive response from the United States12 – this roadmap deduced that the contribution of the Navy, defined as an ”…indispensable, unique and exceptional instrument of the Nation’s foreign policy”,13 should materialise in forward presence, the projection of power, strategic deterrence, control of the sea, maritime supremacy and strategic deployment. And in order to satisfy this remit, it was proposed that the Navy should make certain adjustments to the structure of its troops, capabilities and procedures: • Dividing the fleet into distinct blocks or modules constituted from the fourteen existing carrier-battle and amphibian groups that could autonomously intervene in any operation, from humanitarian aid intervention to combat missions. If necessary, these groups could be added to or integrated into a combined, larger force, capable of waging a limited war. • Modernising and enlarging the support troops to broaden the deployment capacity and autonomous sustainability of the new carrier-battle modules and amphibians as well as the strategic transport of ground forces. • Improving the fleet’s anti-aircraft and anti-missile capacity for providing comprehensive coverage to the troops operating close to the coast14 and 12 More specifically, the Bottom-Up Review proposed a forces structure capable of intervening in two regional conflicts (Major Regional Contingencies) arising almost simultaneously in two distinct regions of the world, allegedly North Korea and Iran/Iraq. Basing itself on Operation Desert Storm, the Pentagon sketched a template scenario whereby the United States armed forces should be prepared to face an enemy army with the following volumes of forces: between 400,000 and 750,000 troops, 2,000-4,000 tanks, 3,000-5,000 infantry combat vehicles, 2,000-3,000 pieces of artillery, 500-1,000 warplanes, 100-200 warships and between 100 and 1,000 short or medium-range ballistic missiles equipped with conventional, chemical, biological, nuclear or radiological warheads. Similarly, the war also prompted Washington to use it as an example of regional contingency and establish the defence requirements of the country basing itself on the capacity to go into combat and triumph in two conflicts of these dimensions, disperse in geographical terms and taking place almost simultaneously. To fight against armies of these characteristics easily identifiable with those of Iraq or North Korea, the American strategists made the following force estimates: 4-5 Army divisions, 4-5 expeditionary brigades of the Marine Corps, 10 fighter attack squadrons, 100 bombers, 4-5 air-sea groups and an indeterminate number of special operations forces (O’HANLON, Michael: Defense Planning for the Late 1990s. Beyond the Desert Storm Framework, Washington DC: The Brookings Institution Press, 1995, pp. 41-56). 13 Department of the Navy: Forward…From the Sea, Washington DC: GPO, 1994, p. 3. 14 To understand this particular threat, among others, posed by anti-ship missiles or cruise missiles in the context of littoral operations, see KREPINEVICH, Andrew; WATTS, Barry and WORK, Robert: Meeting the Anti-Access and Area-Denial Challenge, Washington DC, Centre for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2003 and FREIER, Nathan: The Emerging Anti-Access/Area-Denial
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