395 Guillem Colom Piella Defining the US Navy in the 21st Century inadequacy for the revolution, as an arm of undeniable strategic value in spite of the dangers inherent in their use in certain scenarios.56 Although the transformation of the Navy continued formally anchored in a completely obsolete roadmap, and the economic crisis made a significant dent in its capabilities after losing two air-sea groups, three amphibious groups, various combat and support ships in order to reduce the volume of Marine Corps troops, it nevertheless suffered erosion to a lesser extent than the Air Force or the Army on account of their campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq; besides, it has risen again as one of the driving forces of the new U.S. strategy following the War on Terror and many of the initiatives devised in full revolutionary euphoria are currently taking shape. In a context marked by the erosion of American public opinion over the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq; the redistribution of forward presence and the reduction of bases abroad; the reorientation of its interest towards the Asia-Pacific region or the growing risks that hang over sea traffic and access to any point on the globe; in particular, the Straits of Hormuz and the Sea of China. Naval power has once again regained its protagonism as a tool of foreign policy. The Navy and the Marine Corps are not only especially qualified to maintain a credible, selective forward presence without needing to resort to external bases, to respond rapidly to a crisis or guarantee the security of sea lines of communication; but also to gain access by force to any theatre of operations, as proposed by the controversial Air-Sea Battle, which today constitutes the main priority of the Navy and the base upon which its entire transformation hinges, as does its strategy to maintain its status quo and fight for the Pentagon’s diminishing resources. Many initiatives linked to the revolution and some of Rumsfeld’s most revolutionary projects are now actually taking shape, like the Aegis missile defence shield, that not only represents one of the pillars of the national U.S. system but also the shield of the allies; the drones, one of which took off and aimed from a carrier entirely autonomously via its artificial intelligence; the naval robots and submarines employed on coastguard anti-mine and infrastructure-protection control missions; the Ohio submarines armed with cruise missiles, a cheaper and more effective solution than the Arsenal ships; the Zumwalt destroyers and littoral combat ships heirs of the SC-21 project; the projects of the new amphibian attack ships LX(R) and the missile-launch submarines SSBN(X), the full networked integration of the Navy in the ForceNET or the creation of a virtual fleet entrusted with the task of operating in cyberspace. Three decades after the end of the Cold War, the U.S. Navy continues to be one of the spearheads of the country’s strategy. Although its volume of troops has diminished substantially and the loss of various air-sea groups will leave a dent in its capabilities, 56 HOLST, Henry: “The U.S. Military’s Ultimate Fear: Are Aircraft Carriers Too Big to Fail”, The National Interest, 12 August 2014.
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