http://revista.ieee.es/index.php/ieee 325 Anass Gouyez Ben Allal North Korea´s nuclear programe: the survival of the... Breaking certain moulds, Kim Jong-Un pronounced a New Year’s speech on January 1, 2013 an event that had not occurred since 1994. As was expected, the new leader’s plan fell within the logic of continuity of the Kim dynasty, advocating a “socialist, powerful and prosperous Korea”. In his speech, Kim Jong-Un alluded to the dynastic link; the role of the Korean Labour Party as a political force; the role of the armed forces in the North Korean power scheme; economic policy and the maintenance of the everlasting desideratum of unification with the South46. Indeed, ever since December 12, 2012, following the successful launch of a rocket that put a small North Korean satellite in orbit, the situation on the peninsula has seen a constant escalation in the rhetoric of confrontation punctuated by activities, some of which could be described as pre-war in nature. The United Nations Security Council condemned the launch for violating its ban on developing and testing ballistic missiles, and urged the DPRK to put a halt to the arms race47. This condemnation fell on deaf ears and the DPRK National Defence Commission (chaired by Kim Jong-Un) defiantly replied that a further nuclear test was planned and that it would continue to launch satellites and long-range missiles directed against the “enemy”, the United States; these statements coincided with the announcement by South Korean intelligence sources that technical preparations were underway for a possible nuclear test. The launch of a long-range missile not long afterwards constituted further provocation. Since then, not only have nuclear tests been carried out, but, in addition, there have been increasing threats against South Korea and the United States. The North Korean National Defence Commission announced its intention to proceed to a new “high-level” nuclear test, and in fact the new North Korean leader stated that differences with the United States were regulated by force and not by words48. Thus, with the pretext of the military, naval and aerial manoeuvres of South Korea and the United States, the Pyongyang regime proceeded on February 12, 2013 to carry out its third underground test of nuclear warheads49. This test represented a substantial increase in power in comparison with the previous two: the first, carried out in 2006, was 1 kiloton of power; the second, in 2009, reached 2 Kilotons; and this third was 6 to 7 kilotons, representing a considerable increase. 46 BOLTAINA BOSCH, Xavier, Discurso de año nuevo de Kim Jong Un: ¿Una hoja de ruta para el cambio en Corea del Norte?, Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos, Opinion paper 10/2013, January 30, 2013, pp. 2-3. 47 Security Council Resolution 2087 (2013), January 22, 2013. 48 FALLETTI, Sébastien, “La Corée du Nord annonce un nouvel essai nucléaire”, Le Figaro, published January 24, 2013. 49 Underground tests detonate bombs underground to limit radiation and exposure to radioactive rain on the surface and in the atmosphere. If the tunnels are deep enough to be dug, the radiation can be completely contained, although in some cases the radiation may leak slowly during the months after the test. After each nuclear test, artificial earthquakes caused by the explosion were recorded, the last of these measuring 4.9 degrees on the Richter scale. CÁNOVAS SÁNCHEZ, Bartolomé, op.cit, p.4.
REVISTA_IEEE_10
To see the actual publication please follow the link above