the destruction of a satellite located at an altitude of 300 km. Russia
is considered to have significant ASAT capabilities, in some cases
from projects inherited from the Soviet Union. However, there is
no evidence of the real destruction of satellites in orbit, although
there is proof of missile flight with an ASAT mission, such as the
PL-19 Nudol. In any event, so far it has only been possible to de-stroy
self-owned satellites located in low orbits. Intercepting an
alien satellite, without controlling its movements, involves a more
complex challenge. If, in addition, they are geographic positioning
or geostationary telecommunication satellites, placed in very high
orbits, the issue becomes even more complicated and expensive,
thus raising the question as to whether it is worth attempting phy-
sical destruction.
The obvious response to the limitations of the anti-satellite
systems on Earth is to have available platforms located in space.
These are the so-called “killer satellites”, capable of manoeuvring
between orbits and eliminating a large number of enemy satellites
at the cost of a single launch. However, so far there have been
more killer satellites in fiction literature than in reality. In 2018, the
United States accused Russia of testing one of them upon verifying
the strange behaviour and manoeuvrability of the Kosmos 2521.
However, there is no definite evidence suggesting that it was an
ASAT satellite programme.
Something similar occurs with the U.S. X-37 orbital test ve-hicle,
also capable of manoeuvring between orbits, and which
could be used to capture enemy satellites. The possibility of cap-turing
satellites instead of destroying them is particularly interest-ing
since it prevents the production of fragments, which is very
US Air Force
common in physical destruction and could pose a serious risk to
other spacecraft.
Nevertheless, the greatest challenge ASAT weapons have to
face is the progressive miniaturization of satellites, as this also
involves a significant reduction in launch costs. The production
of microsatellites, of which a complete fleet can be put into orbit
in a single launch, may render efforts to physically destroy them
economically unviable. In some cases, a space launch is not even
necessary, and microsatellites can be put in orbit from a fighter at
very high altitude, as in the Spanish Pilum programme. Although an
ASAT system could jam, destroy or remove most of a microsatellite
fleet, it would not cost much to place another fleet into orbit to re-place
the previous one.
ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL OPPORTUNITIES
One of the most important aspects left unclear by the Outer Space
Treaty was the right to explore commercial resources in space. Al-though
it established that a state cannot claim sovereignty over
a celestial body, nothing is stipulated concerning the commercial
exploitation of the mineral resources that this body may contain. In
recent years, several states have taken advantage of this legal gap
to claim their right to exploit resources in space.
Today, the economic exploitation of space resources still faces
the problem of high costs. However, an increasing number of states
and companies believe that the relationship between costs and po-tential
gains is starting to balance out. In a few years, the commercial
exploitation of some high-value mineral and energy resources could
well be profitable. This is the case of lunar helium 3, which has in-
We need to retain the idea that outer space should be
a peaceful environment and a global commons
42 Revista Española de Defensa August 2020