THE MIDDLE EAST; DETERRENCE AND NUCLEAR DETERRENCE I. DETERRENCE THEORY I.I. History When analyzing the Middle East nuclear policy there is a clear need to review deterrence theory and the current regional understanding of deterrence strategies. Deterrence theory has probably been one of the most studied theories in International Relations since the Cold War era until present, becoming none less contested and still sparking several controversial debates about its validity. To begin with, in order to define deterrence it is worth mentioning the classical definition by Thomas Schelling, which became popular during the Cold War, and by which deterrence was defined as a military strategy based on the issue of a threat intended to refrain an adversary from starting something.1 In other words, deterrence intends to avoid an adversary from pursuing an action. In the International Relations context a threat is normally perceived as an act which includes a military dimension and implies the capability to project military power to any other actor or adversary. Deterrence theory departs from being the relations between states the heart of its central paradigm. It should be emphasized that, according to this paradigm, states operate in an anarchic international system. The absence of a central authority is considered to be the main reason to justify the inherent conflict nature of the international politics. In such a chaotic system, states should endeavor to have levels of power in order to ensure achieving national interests of their respective countries.2 This is the main argument that deterrence classical theory has adopted in order to justify the need of a state to use its power in order to influence other states decisions. Nevertheless, as it will be further explained through this article, the appearance of nuclear weapons as an extended mean of deterrence, has been changing the initial deterrence model circumstances by the proliferation and sophistication of nuclear 1 SCHELLING, Thomas C. Arms and Influence, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966. 2 SODUPE, Keppa. La teoría de la disuasión: un análisis de las debilidades del paradigma estatocéntrico. Barcelona: Àfers Internacionals, núm. 22, CIDOB, 1991, pp. 54-55. http://revista.ieee.es/index.php/ieee 381
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