385 Daniel Rajmil The middle east; deterrence and nuclear deterrence vulnerabilities, the propensity to take risks, the bases of power, the most valued assets and other factors are likely to influence key decisions.11 To sum up, the target of deterrence actions and what is considered to be a security risk to the country integrity directly depends on the values and the defense policy lines that the country follows. In that sense, as seen during the recent nuclear negotiations in the Middle East, Iran for example, may have different guidelines than other countries of the region, perceiving as a national threat what other entities would consider it differently. This is where one of the main questions of this article appears; into what extent is feasible or has any sense to predict deterrence strategies as they depend on non always shared rational decisions. This complex set of perceptions games is difficult to assess and predict in general levels. These differences, both randomly and systematically influence the deterrence power.12 Considering the importance of the above mentioned conditions and as understood by the deterrence concept itself it’s now important to introduce the notion that deterrence theory was conceived within a self operated “punishment” system. For the same, deterrence could also be used to prevent other sorts of harm from an actor’s development of nuclear weapons or by a state which might want to deter the formation by its opponents of an alliance, or an opponent taking control of a valuable strategic position.13 Lastly, before finishing this introduction on deterrence theory; the deterrence concept should be also regarded differently from compellence, the latter referring to “the use of threats to manipulate the behavior of others so they will stop doing something unwanted or do something they were not previously doing”.14 However, while being different both concepts are normally used behind the logics of a same punishment strategy from one entity to another adversary entity. Whilst deterrence’s main objective is to prevent that some action won’t be initiated, compellence refers more to the change of the course, to persuade the opponent to change his behavior.15 As they tend to appear together, both concepts can be located in an overall strategy of coercive diplomacy. 11 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, Post-Cold War Conflict Deterrence, National Academy of Sciences, 1997, p. 3. 12 JERVIS, R. Deterrence and Perception, International Security, Vol. 7, Winter 1982-83, p. 3. 13 MORGAN, Patrick M. Non-State actors, Nuclear Next Use, and Deterrence, California: University of California Irvine, July 2011, p. 1. 14 MORGAN, Patrick M. Deterrence Now, Cambridge Studies in International Relations, Cambridge University Press 2003, p. 2. 15 SLANTCHEV, Branislav L Deterrence and compellence. Introduction to International Relations, Department of Political Sciences, University of San Diego, 2005, p. 2. http://revista.ieee.es/index.php/ieee
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