390 Journal of the Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies N. 6 / 2015 conditions were given; firstly, each side has the ability, if attacked by the other, to inflict on the attacker in a way that the produced damage would deter and recalculate all possible gains of the other country to initiate an attack; secondly, no side can rule out that the other might use their nuclear ability if attacked.29 These two basic conditions are believed to be one of the main reasons why MAD situation could work, moreover, indirectly it assumed that there is a possibility to eliminate the adversary in only one time. In addition, a further implied condition on this assessment is the fact that both actors share a same rationality where they would fear mutual destruction. This is one of the main points when considering the future nuclear policy of the region and the doubts that appear when looking into the respective Iranian and Israeli nuclear strategies. The difficulties to assess if the same logics of the Cold War era would work today are challenging. Following this, no nuclear confrontation has occurred through recent history as none of the actors involved, were irrational enough to set in motion such a catastrophic confrontation. Most of the current nuclear strategies take for granted the basic assumption that the fulfillment of a wellplanned policy with nuclear assets as its main deterrent agent, will convince potential rivals that any military action against them would lead to the final failure of their goals. II. II. Nuclear deterrence dilemmas Nuclear deterrence as a deterrence strategy cannot be reduced to the simple assessment of possession of nuclear weapons in order to prevent an adversary to do an unwanted action, yet to a more complex political and military process which is based on cost-benefits calculations contained in the different national defense strategies. In the case of the Middle East, nuclear deterrence strategy has been seen under a broader Arab-Israeli conflict where other regional dynamics are also present. Moreover, in the Middle East, regional states are embraced on nuclear deterrence games with other states such as the United States or Russia who play an important extended deterrence role, turning it into a much more complex situation, difficult to predict by the classical conception of nuclear deterrence. Overall there is a clear problem with nuclear deterrence as well with the deterrence theory itself: they both work under assumptions and speculations which could in reality fail due to their strong psychological and cognitive components. Nuclear deterrence has probably worked in the past, however in order to work nowadays and 29 FISHER, David. Morality and the Bomb, Croom Helm, 1985, p. 7. http://revista.ieee.es/index.php/ieee
Revista del IEEE 6
To see the actual publication please follow the link above