410 Journal of the Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies N. 6 / 2015 be available, in addition to an aircraft carrier and various landing means. To face a regional conflict, the pivot of military action would be the light-armored brigade that could be reinforced with a heavy-armored brigade, and air and aero-naval support. Should there be an aggression against Western Europe, France would rely on nuclear deterrence, and the use of all its entire conventional forces. A mixed model of human resources based on universal conscription and a professional militia was defended. Mandatory military service was justified because a professional model could mean two restrictions: an insufficient number of volunteers to cover the staff, and a very high cost in detriment of expenditure for armament and materiel. On the contrary, a mixed model would allow the professionals to concentrate on projectable forces while the recruits would be assigned to support tasks, and to the units deployed in French territory. Nonetheless, this approach had an ephemeral life since, only two years later, in 1996, universal military service was abolished, which shows the lack of consistency with the approaches of the political authorities at the time. Regarding the defense industry, the White Paper upheld the supervisory authority of the Ministry of Defense over the industrial sector, subordinating it to the defense strategy, and to the foreign objectives of the State. The insufficient capacity of the domestic market to absorb most of its own industrial production, the intensification of the competition in international markets, and the greater complexity of technology, and its increasing costs, rendered advisable the design of a new policy for industry, and for weaponry. In nuclear armament, France should maintain its technological self-sufficiency in delivery missiles, guidance systems, warheads, and means of command and control. Two objectives would be covered in conventional armament: the preservation of the capability of its own design and manufacturing, and the commencement of cooperation programs with allied countries.14 Regarding the budget framework, this road map placed a horizon of 2010 as a limit for its budget. Between 1965 and 1982, French military expenditures rose to 4% of GDP, and since then, a gradual decrease to 3.4% in 1994, which affected the objectives of power, the catalogs of capacities, and the plans of acquisition of weaponry and materiel.15 The White Paper ruled out the increase of defense expenditures, but argued for the need to increase the expenditures on weaponry, for the integration of new technologies as well as for the need to renew all the obsolete materiel. This modernization would require difficult decisions regarding several industrial sectors, as the purchases were suspended or cut back if they did not respond to the guidelines of the new model of armed forces to be shaped throughout the decade.16 14 CONZE, Henry. “France’s defense procurement strategy: looking to the future”, The RUSI Journal, vol. 140 nº 2, 1995, pp. 48-51. 15 AUFRANT, Marc. “France and its allies: A comparative study of defence spending trends since 1985”, Defence and Peace Economics, vol. 10 nº1, 1999, pp. 79-102. 16 HÉBERT, Jean-Paul. The strategic debate about weaponry 1992-2005, Le Mesnil-sur-l’Estrée, CIRPES-Groupe de Sociologie de la Défense de l’École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, 2006. http://revista.ieee.es/index.php/ieee
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