426 Journal of the Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies N. 6 / 2015 integrated military structure of the sixties – a hypothetical invasion of Western Europe and, since the end of the Cold War, a deep reform of its entity and organization, along with the incorporation of military capabilities linked to the Revolution of Military Affairs, and of a growing projection abroad. In this sense, it is interesting to highlight that the French strategic culture has repeatedly shown its independence of thought and of doctrinal elaboration, to the point that it can be affirmed that the French armed forces are the most autonomous in this area of all those integrated in the allied and the European frameworks. Likewise, this French uniqueness also rests on a technological and industrial capability in many defense sectors which is incomparable in Europe. France is politically, strategically, and militarily autonomous because it has an industrial structure that allows it, as its stance in the allied and European frameworks repeatedly reveal. In this sense, for a mid-size power such as Spain, the lessons from our neighbor should be a source of study and inspiration, more so if we consider that our axis of security is not in the North of the continent but in the Mediterranean area, in the north of Africa, and in the Sahel. Nonetheless, not all are good news for French defense. The peace dividend linked to the end of the Cold War considerably reduced military expenditure, and opened a breach between the strategic objectives, and the means to satisfy them, which have only grown. Even though the White Paper of 2008 tried to renew the pillars of French national defense, the economic crisis that was looming ended up jeopardizing its execution and forced it to draw up a new road map. Conditioned by the financial situation of the country, the White Paper of 2013 –and the Military Programme Law that went along with it– continued with the unstoppable reduction of the size and capabilities of the French armed forces, and deepened the breach between the traditional aspirations of the Elysée Palace to perform the role of major power, and the allocation of resources to its armed forces. In spite of the innumerable warnings regarding the erosion of the military capabilities of the country, it was necessary to wait until the events of Charlie Hebdo last January for France to redefine its decisions. The prominence given to the budget adjustments over any other strategic consideration, and the effects of the economic crisis on the finances of the country made it difficult to imagine a different scenario. Nonetheless, these terrorist attacks have mediated so France modified the Military Programme Law, increased the defense expenditure, increased the size of land forces, and showed determination to combat international terrorism with weapons. Although this change of trend is very significant, in real terms this increase in the budget of 3.8 billion Euros for the next three years is estimated to be insufficient, as the Gaullist opposition warned. Perhaps, if important international events of great impact took place –a generalized conflict in Europe (something that the White Paper of 2013 rules out based on Russian assertiveness, or a systemic crisis in the north of Africa– and they were perceived as a direct threat to the security of France, and of its most vital interests, a significant increase in French military expenditure could be http://revista.ieee.es/index.php/ieee
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