297 Carlos Javier Frías Sánchez Conventional deterrence attempts to divert public attention away from domestic political instability13 towards foreign crises, which might have very little to do with the real crisis created (a classic example is the Argentinian occupation of the Falkland Islands in 1982). The more alien and different the culture, history, language and values of the states involved, the easier it is to misinterpret the cost-benefit analysis14. It is equally important to bear in mind that, from the perspective of the actor we want to deter, both action and inaction involve costs. Consequently, any deterrent strategy should take account of the consequences for the adversary both if the action being deterred is carried out as well as if it is not carried out. Hence, it can be conclu-ded that, in the case of a particular action, some states will be motivated by necessity, while others will be motivated by opportunity15. States motivated by necessity are those for whom the costs of inaction outweigh the cost of taking the action being deterred. On the other hand, states motivated by opportunity are those who anticipate a favou-rable cost-benefit outcome from the action, given that the costs are expected to be lower than the benefit that will be obtained in the present circumstances, there being no significant cost-benefit to be obtained through inaction16. States driven by necessity will be much more difficult to deter, while those motivated by opportunity only re-quire that the perceived cost of the action not be very high. This difference influences the effectiveness and choice of the deterrence model used in each case. General and tailored deterrence A distinction can be drawn between immediate or tailored deterrence, which aims to prevent a specific behaviour17, and general deterrence, which aims to avoid aggres-sion http://revista.ieee.es/index.php/ieee in a broad sense18. 13 LEBOW, Richard N. Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis, Baltimore, John Hop-kins University, 1981, pp. 61-69. 14 ARREGUÍN-TOFT, Ivan. Unconventional Deterrence: How the Weak Deter the Strong, in PAUL, T.V. et al. Complex Deterrence. Strategy in the Global Age. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009, pp. 204-221, p. 209. 15 KUPCHAN, Charles A. The End of the American Era. New York: Vintage Books, 2002, p. 206. 16 The discussion about the cost of action and the cost of inaction is a central theme of the Prospect Theory, which looks at the greater tendency and efforts made to avoid losses compared to those invested in obtaining advantages. A summary can be found in KAHNEMAN, Daniel and TVERSKY, Amos. Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk. Article published in Econometrica, Vol. no. 47 March 1979, pp. 263-91. 17 FREEDMAN, Lawrence. Disarmament and Other Nuclear Norms, The Washington Quarterly, no. 36, vol. 2, 2013, pp. 93-108. 18 MORGAN. Op. cit., p. 30.
REVISTA IEEE 8
To see the actual publication please follow the link above