http://revista.ieee.es/index.php/ieee 298 Journal of the Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies Núm. 8 / 2016 General deterrence does not involve specific reactions to specific actions taken by the adversary, nor is the enemy necessarily identified19. Tailored deterrence, on the other hand, requires conducting a detailed analysis of the adversary, including his motivations, so as to be able to set specific deterrence actions for concrete actions. However, it is sometimes necessary to introduce a degree of ambiguity into the threats in order to maintain the flexibility and freedom of action of the deterring country, despite the risk of allowing the adversary to have doubts as to whether the threats made will actually be carried out20. In a practical example, the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy21 of the Secretary of Defense, James Schlesinger, in 1970 analysed the vulnerabilities of the senior leaders of the USSR’s Communist Party - not actually those of the USSR - in order to be able to adapt the nuclear threats of the U.S. to these vulnerabilities22. An example of tailored deterrence with ambiguity would be the U.S. Guarantees to protect Taiwan against China. The U.S. stated that «it would oppose the use of military force against Taiwan», but did not specify how it intended to do this23. The tailored deterrence process is developed in three stages: the first one entails de-sign/ planning to analyse the adversary’s perceptions of the threat and to determine his priority interests. In the second stage, measures are set to exploit the adversary’s fears and potential threats to its vital interests and, in the third stage, the adversary is clearly informed about what behaviour is to be avoided and what the consequences will be should it ignore the threats, and, finally, the effectiveness of the strategy is evaluated24. One of the most common threats in this type of deterrence is the threat of freezing the (personal and institutional) foreign financial assets of rival political leaders. In general deterrence, the threat is vague and the measures to be adopted are not specific. The armed forces responsible for implementing it have not received specific training for a particular adversary and must therefore spread their efforts and have a wide range of capabilities. As a result, general deterrence is less effective and more costly than tailored deterrence. The distinction between general and tailored deterrence also requires drawing a distinction between a deterrence situation and a deterrence strategy. The first is the situation created as a result of a general deterrence, without the need to target it at 19 PAYNE, Keith B. and WALTON C. Dale. Deterrence in the Post-Cold War World, in BAYLIS, John et al., Strategy in the Contemporary World, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 161-182, p. 163. 20 PAYNE and WALTON. Op. cit., p. 164. 21 U.S. Department of Defense. Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy. 10 April 1970. At http:// www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB173/SIOP-25.pdf 22 PAYNE, Keith. Understanding Deterrence, Comparative Strategy no. 30, 2011, pp. 393–427, pp. 415-416. 23 PAYNE and WALTON. Op. cit., p. 164. 24 ADAMSKY. Op. cit., p. 8.
REVISTA IEEE 8
To see the actual publication please follow the link above