299 Carlos Javier Frías Sánchez Conventional deterrence any particular adversary. Current military capabilities and the willingness to use them would suffice to deter a wide range of potential adversaries. The second, on the other hand, requires the implementation of specific measures tailored to specific adversaries and the goal is to achieve tailored deterrence25. National deterrence and extended deterrence Another interesting distinction is national or «passive» deterrence (also known as core, national or central deterrence) versus «extended» or «active» deterrence)26. National deterrence would be the one used in the event of a direct attack. Exten-ded deterrence, on the other hand, uses all the instruments at the disposal of a state to protect a third country, be it an ally, a neutral nation or even another adversary27. An example of extended deterrence would be how the U.S. forces deterred the USSR from attacking the nascent (and anti-North American) Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979. The beneficiary of extended deterrence can therefore be passive, indifferent or even ignorant of the fact that a deterrent action is being carried out on its behalf28. The word active implies a voluntary act, not carried out solely in self-defence, and invol-ving a state that is willing to respond to an attack on another state. The difference between «national» deterrence and «extended» deterrence lies in cre-dibility29. Therefore, with extended deterrence there is always the possibility that, in the event of a crisis, the state will give priority to its own interests and may choose to abandon its allies before taking the risk of suffering damage on behalf of other states’interests30. DETERRENCE BY DENIAL AND DETERRENCE BY PUNISHMENT In order to be able to carry out any action, one must have the capability and wi-llingness to do it. Consequently, to prevent a specific actor from taking a particular 25 PAUL, T.V. Op. cit., pp. 38-39. 26 ANDERSON and LARSEN. Op. cit., p. 2. 27 PIFER, Steven et al. U.S. Nuclear and Extended Deterrence, Washington: Brookings Arms Con-trol Series, Paper no. 3. Brookings Institution, May 2010, p. 1. 28 ANDERSON and LARSEN. Op. cit., p. 5. 29 SCHELLING, Thomas C. Arms and Influence, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966, p. 36. 30 GOLDSTEIN. Op. cit., p. 43. http://revista.ieee.es/index.php/ieee
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