303 Carlos Javier Frías Sánchez Conventional deterrence Korea45; this could be a more effective deterrent than any military reaction to Chinese and South Korean pressure on Kim-Jong-un’s regime. The last option described - the development of sufficient military capability so as to be able to inflict an unacceptable level of damage on any potential aggressor - is the one in which nuclear weapons play the most prominent role. Nevertheless, the growing capabilities of conventional weapons equipped with precision-guided mu-nition has led some academics to believe that it is now possible to attain a level of deterrence similar to that of nuclear weapons using conventional means46. In the pre-sent day, however, only the United States has this capacity (and to a limited degree), and it would only be effective when used against relatively developed states whose economies reply on the proper functioning of critical and vulnerable industries and infrastructure. In general, in «deterrence by punishment», the targets for destruction are counter-value targets, i.e., elements that are essential for the functioning of society (industrial centres, infrastructure and large population centres). It should be borne in mind that, while the level of damage that can be inflicted on a particular adversary using conventional weapons may be huge, it is always going to be limited. Consequently, in certain cases, it cannot be guaranteed that the adversary will not be willing to pay the cost of obtaining a benefit, no matter how high the price. This would be the case when what the adversary regards as vital interests are at stake. Therefore, with «deterrence by punishment» using conventional means, it will always be necessary to assess not only the price you are willing to make the adversary pay for taking a particular course of action, but also the perceived benefits of the action it is being deterred from and the costs arising from the inaction it is intended to impose on the adversary. This cost-benefit analysis is a way of determining the importance the adversary attaches to the cause he is defending in a conflict. The relative importance that western societies attach to potential conflicts where their survival is not at stake is an issue that has been addressed again and again when studying why superpowers repeatedly fail in counterinsurgency campaigns. A study on this difference in interests can be found in Andrew Mack’s article, Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars47. Mack essentially argues that the greater the interests at stake, the greater the commitment, in application of Clausewitz’s axiom that «war is a 45 PLANT, Thomas and RHODE, Ben. China, North Korea and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons, Survival journal, vol. 55, no. 2, pp. 61-80, p. 62. 46 WOOLF, Amy F. Conventional Prompt Global Strike and Long-Range Ballistic Missiles: Background and Issues, Washington, Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, CRS Report for Congress, 6 July 2012, pp. 2-4. At http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R41464.pdf, 12 March 2014. 47 MACK, Andrew. Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict, World Politics journal, vol. 27, no. 2, January 1975, pp. 175–200. http://revista.ieee.es/index.php/ieee
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