http://revista.ieee.es/index.php/ieee 308 Journal of the Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies Núm. 8 / 2016 Where interests are concerned, the conclusions reached after studying the characte-ristics of deterrence by punishment and the cost-benefit analyses of states would apply, i.e., in the event of a conflict where one of the states is motivated by opportunity and the other by necessity, the latter will be able to assume a much greater level of sacrifice than the former, to the extent that the latter will have a much greater chance of winning. One factor in which interests play a key role in the credibility of a deterrence strate-gy is proportionality: if the deterrent is not rational, i.e., if the magnitude of the threat is not proportional to the scale of the action being deterred (that is, to the interests at stake), there will be significant credibility issues68. The problem of proportionality has historically been an «Achilles’heel» of nuclear deterrence, especially where the West is concerned. As early as 1958, British Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery (the NATO Deputy Supreme Allied Commander for Europe at the time) wondered if, in the event of minor Russian aggression with conventional forces, it was realistic to expect that69: «The West would use its nuclear deterrent as weapons against the cities of Russia and receive in return Russian retaliation which would put the United Kingdom and the U.S.A. out of business? For us (the British) to act in this way would be to commit national suicide. I do not believe it will happen. When both sides have nuclear suffi-ciency, the deterrent will merely serve to deter each side from using it as a weapon». Montgomery’s criticism was in response to the adoption by NATO, in 1957, of the Massive Retaliation doctrine70. This doctrine advocated that the protection of Eu-ropean NATO territory would require the «immediate exploitation of (this tactical) nuclear capability whether or not the Soviets used nuclear weapons»71. In reality, if the only possible response in the event of an aggression was a full-on thermonuclear war, deterrence in itself would lose credibility in the eyes of the adversary, and it would be difficult for the European allies, who were allegedly protected by U.S. nuclear dete-rrence, to consider this guarantee to be better than any other solution to a crises that would at least ensure their survival. The credibility issue with deterrence is not confined to an assessment of the pro-portionality of the behaviour that is to be deterred and the response designed; a much more direct and immediate problem is to have the capability to follow through on the threats made. In the case of conventional deterrence, the quality and quantity of the military resources available will usually be enough proof of this capability or lack the-reof, bearing in mind that the complete destruction of conventional military capabili-ty is a difficult process and not easy to achieve in a short period of time. Nevertheless, 68 MORGAN, Patrick M. Op. cit., pp. 87-88. 69 POWASKI, Robert E. The entangling alliance: The United States and European security, 1950– 1993, Westport: Greenwood Press, 1994, p. 39. 70 National Atlantic Treaty Organization. NATO’s Strategic Concept MC 14/2. 71 Ibid.
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