309 Carlos Javier Frías Sánchez Conventional deterrence it is possible to destroy key elements of conventional capability using surprise attacks such as the Israelis did during the Six-Day War (1967), which began with a surprise air strike of the air force bases in Arab countries, and left Israel in almost complete control of the skies, a move that was decisive for its overwhelming victory72. http://revista.ieee.es/index.php/ieee ESCALATION While deterrence primarily aims to avoid a conflict, it can also play a pivotal role in controlling the level of violence in a conflict that has already begun. Kahn called this type of deterrence intra-war deterrence73. It entails the implementation of mili-tary measures that become progressively more intense and/or more violent (a process known as escalation). In a typical escalation situation, the opponents compete when implementing mi-litary measures, each assuming greater risks and showing increased determination to achieve their goals. Escalation is therefore a conflict characterised by the progressive use of violence, whereby each opponent tries, by stepping up the measures taken, to get the other side to give up on its goals. Escalation, like all forms of deterrence, is an exchange of information between two adversaries, in that the measures taken are messages, and because these messa-ges are conveyed in their own unique language, the risk of their being misinterpre-ted is very high. Consequently, the main risk with escalation is that the adversary might overreact74 after misinterpreting a particular message. Therefore, a key issue when designing successive deterrence measures in an escalation campaign is to es-timate the importance the adversary will attach to each measure: it is very hard to know with sufficient precision the other state’s cost-benefit calculations and, con-sequently, determine the retaliatory measures capable of changing the adversary’s political priorities75. In terms of conventional (not nuclear) confrontations, mo-ving from one step to the next in the ladder of escalation is most effective when it is massive and sudden76. 72 BAR-ON, Mordechai, A Never-ending Conflict: A Guide to Israeli Military History, Mechanicsburg: Stackpole Books, 2006. 73 KAHN, Herman. On Escalation. Metaphors and Scenarios, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965, p. 3. 74 Ibid. 75 MORGAN, Patrick M. Op. cit., p. 60. 76 HAMMES, T. X. Offshore Control: A Proposed Strategy for an Unlikely Conflict, Washington: National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies, Strategic Forum, June 2012, p. 4.
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