362 Journal of the Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies Núm. 8 / 2016 institutions as well as the criminal justice institutions, it is possible that within a short period of time, and this is indeed what has happened in some cases, organised crime will move to entities that invest less in security, such as Aguascalientes, Colima, Que-rétaro, Durango, Campeche, Nayarit, Tlaxcala, Quintana Roo, Zacatecas or Yucatán56. The second alternative is more worrying and is linked to the «security traps» that Bailey referred to for Mexico. Here, the possibility that comes up is that these resources are not contributing efficiently to the strengthening of adequate security structures. In fact, it is worrying that the subsidies that should go towards strengthening the reform of the state security agencies (state police, judicial police and prison guards) and the reform of the operating model of the criminal justice system receive such a small amount of money compared to all the others. The SPA and the SETEC that to some extent underpin the public national security system, only receive 13,244,000,000 pesos and 3,462,000,000 pesos respectively, and have not benefitted from the co-participation of the federal entities, which probably contributed to the fact that the commitment from the side of the entities in this process was not well defined. For the SPA, in February 2016 there was no information nor clear evidence on the number of accredited units of state police, ministerial police, nor accredited guards. This is serious, especially considering that the current debate is focused on the single command of State governors over municipal police forces. If this is the case, it brings into question the results of the investment of the 62,623,000,000 pesos from the FORTAMUN, the 60,282,000,000 pesos from the FASP, and the 45,121,000,000 pesos from the SUBSEMUN over the years, as well as the 609,773,000,000 allocated by the Mexican federal entities. If, however, the money has served to sufficiently strengthen the public security institutions, the current debate on the «single command» and political distrust wouldn’t make sense as there would already be unquestionable municipal corporations, trustworthy, institutionalised and professio-nal state police structures that run little risk of turning into police forces «at the service of the governor» instead of at the service of citizens or the incumbent mayor. PARTY POSITIONS AS REGARDS THE PROFESSIONAL PROFILES OF THE CIVIL SERVANTS IN CHARGE OF THE PUBLIC SECURITY SYSTEM REFORM A consequence of the state of abandon in which the public security policy has historically been left in Mexico is the lack of professionals and political leaders who 56 The case of the state of Morelos is particularly worrying because despite being one of the federal entities with the greatest perception of insecurity (CASEDE. Atlas de la seguridad y violencia en Morelos. Universidad Autónoma del Estado de Morelos: México CASEDE, 2014), the investment in public security and access to jus-tice is moderate. Between 2008 and 2015, the state of Morelos budgeted 6,160,000,000 pesos for this heading, with an additional 3,575,000,000 pesos in funds and subsidies. http://revista.ieee.es/index.php/ieee
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