Revista del Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos n.º 12 - Año: 2018 - Págs.: 134657 a 13795 376 Journal of the Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies Núm. 12 / 2018 However, referring to the conclusions drawn from different negotiations between members of international institutions, if nations perceive that their alternatives are deteriorating, they will move their strategy around towards one of cooperation, thus lowering their point of resistance. Similarly, the chances of overcoming a stalemate will be greater provided they have a mediator and agree on a text in writing, although prospective theory tells us that people tend to take the same risks to avoid losing rather than securing a win30. In seeking to find this type of solution to the Iranian nuclear problem, a win-win scenario had to be considered, rather than a situation that would adversely affect any of the parties. There were more inherent difficulties in how to reach agreement, than in the agreement itself. It was necessary to find common ground among all the players that would facilitate a return to the negotiating table. As we have seen here, a paradoxical context had been reached that, a priori, did not allow any of the actors to maximize their gains. However, to date no arms race has ever come to an end on account of a cooperation agreement being reached, but rather because events have been altered by an event not directly related to the original root of the problem. What is generally needed is some form of stimulus external to the negotiation per se that can trigger game changes, brin-ging about new solutions to the conflict31. Continuing along the timeline of events, we move forward to 2009, which marked a break in defection dynamics between the players and the first instance of coopera-tion between the IC and Iran, an event that merits analysis to discover the cause of that alteration in game dynamics. The strategy of posing a threat to cooperation in part answers that question, because if we start from the premise that the parties in-volved were immersed in a Chicken Game, the Iranian government should never have chosen to defect. On the other hand, it could be interpreted that Teheran temporarily opted for cooperation by accepting the Vienna agreement and the Teheran Declara-tion, although neither of these were to last for long. This research has closely analysed each of the movements of the players (nations) involved in the nuclear negotiations, with a view to gaining a deeper understanding of their strategies. Once we had determined that the players consisted of the E3/EU+3 on the one hand and the Iranian government on the other, we reviewed each move-ment for the duration of the conflict, as if the players involved were always the same; although, as we shall see, this was not exactly the case. When conflict between countries takes place over a period of time, in addition to saving the anomalies of single-set games, changes in administrations can be an 30 ODELL, John S. “Breaking Deadlocks in International Institutional Negotiations: The WTO, Seattle and Doha”, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 53, No 2, 2009, p. 273-274. 31 DOWNS, George W., ROCKE, David M. and SIVERSON, Randolph M. “Arms races and cooperation”, World Politics, Vol. 38, no 1, 1985, p. 119.
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