195 Palmerino Cuneo Terrorism and organised crime: The system of “permanent… The decision of the jihadist groups in the Sahel whether to affiliate with Al Qaeda or ISIS depends primarily on the specific goals and inter-ethnic dynamics, which are determined by the local context and where these cells develop49. As mentioned, factors such as the territorial political and social fabric and local interests of clans and of the transnational crime networks that support them also come into play50. In short, jihad-ism exploits local tensions and feeds on them to achieve its political and economic goals, and its adaptability to one model or another is tied to the political and social changes of the countries involved51, as well as the rivalries between old and new gen-erations of fighters, and lastly the degree of mutual permeability between organised crime and jihadist cells. The tendency of terrorist groups to build alliances depends on both the interna-tional political-military pressure and on the local regimes52, and on all the structural factors that constitute their breeding ground. The local purpose of jihadism needs to be underlined, which is why it should not be considered a monolithic global threat, but rather local insurgence with global repercussions, with two standard bearers as a visible front: Al Qaeda and ISIS. In this context, the grassroots extremists take their and illicit trafficking, with very fluid boundaries. Moreover, it can be seen that the separation of Ghabat al Nusra from Al Qaeda has received approval from from Al Zawahiri (in: https://goo.gl/ xWAQUw - consulted on: 2 May 2018). 49 MAZZONE, Carolina. “La competizione tra Al-Quaeda e Daesh in Africa Sub-Sahariana”, Revista CeSI (Centro Studi Internazionale), 13 May 2016. Available at: https://goo.gl/PyNNfY (consulted on: 5 May 2018). 50 Shekau’s Boko Haram itself — which experienced a recent decline as a result of the efforts of the MNJTF (Multinational Joint Task Force, which includes 8-10,000 soldiers from Chad, Niger, Nigeria, Benin and Cameroun) — is suffering from internal strife, with a possible split by the branch led by Al Barnawi and loyal to Al Qaeda; this partly helps to understand the greater thrust towards ISIS and its Libyan affiliates. 51 UNITED STATE INSTITUTE FOR PEACE. The Jihadi Treath, ISIS, al-Qaeda, and beyond, Washington, 2017, p. 28. Available at: https://goo.gl/f9Jofy (consulted on: 2 May 2018). 52 For example Idriss Déby, President of Chad since 1990, the “sheriff” who in 2013 sent his soldiers to support the French in Mali against an embryonic caliphate, on the eastern side supports the “brother” of same ethnic origin, Ibrahim Khalil, leader of the Jem (Justice and Equality Movement) who, by agitating in favour of independence for Darfur, wanted to depose President al-Bashir in 2008 and replace Hassan al-Tourabi, redefining the state on the basis of the sharia and radical Islamism. Meanwhile, Boko Haram inexplicably uses weapons from the Chad army, and France intervenes directly with its supplies of weapons and mercenaries (in: https://goo.gl/ SQGSZP - consulted on: 2 May 2018). Boko Haram finds refuge in the area close to Cameroun where its leader, Paul Biya – in power for 41 years – does not fight against it, conscious of the fact that Boko Haram’s activity ensures that Nigeria does not insist on the territorial claims to ownership of the Bakassi peninsula in a coastal area rich in oil. There is also a strange friendship between Sudan’s Muslim President Omar al-Bashir and Joseph Kony, Christian leader of the Lord’s Resistance Army which from Uganda is ramping up its incursions into the towns and villages of South Sudan (FUMAGALLI, Giuseppe. “Terrorismo in Africa: le complicitá dei regimi autoritari”, Rivista dell’Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, 11 April 2016. Available at: https://goo.gl/ nZDg57 - consulted on: 2 May 2018). Revista del Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos n.º 13 - Año: 2019 - Págs.: 181 a 212
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