196 Journal of the Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies Núm. 13 / 2019 inspiration from the ideology of either group or, in some cases, both53. This means that it is important not to be side-tracked by a war of acronyms, or by the religious aspects of the movement, or the tactics they use and the global goals they pursue. Rather, what matters are the structural causes that generate the synergy between jihadism and violent acts, which are committed because of the interests of oppressive regimes, rival militias, terrorist groups, sectarian differences, tribal tensions, criminal organisations and foreign interventions. In short, we are faced with a heterogeneous, fragmented and native terrorist phe-nomenon which confirms its local nature through the fact that it is embedded in the context of an expansion of the illicit economy, which, although not fully owned by terrorism, functions under the control of different local gangs and clans, so that any exterior blow immediately leads to action by the local population54. Hence, waging a full-scale war against a single and homogenous enemy does not make sense, because its resilience lies in the local fabric and is moulded by the support of organised crime. In the Sahel, the jihad is local and this applies equally to the true terrorist threat. The increase of terrorist attacks from 2015 onwards confirms — despite its anti-Western and anticolonial rhetoric — that the strategic scope of this threat is still confined to local and sub regional scenarios. The reasons for this are basically two: the extreme fragmentation of the jihadist framework and the unequal relationship between jihad-ists and criminal agents55. The contemporary presence and proliferation of armed groups and Islamist mi-litias which act as “drugs mafias” regardless of their faith, proves that the greatest interest in cloaking themselves in jihadism lies in enhancing their own potential for doing business. If agreements between transnational crime gangs and terror-ist groups have guaranteed a distribution of business according to their respective strategic interests, this situation has simultaneously caused a structural dependency — in terms of both capital and human resources — of the jihadist groups on crim-inal organisations. This is explained by their reliance on the latter’s extensive crimi-nal networks and consequent capacity for channelling arms, funds and documents, as well as providing logistics support and access to their connections to the global financial circuit. Finally, the role of the economic factor in this “competition” must not be overlooked: the multi-layered management of illicit trafficking and the extensive cross-permeation 53 SCOTT, Stewart. “Tracking global terrorism”, Stratfor, 18 de enero 2018. Available at: https://goo. gl/XG3b5n (consulted on: 2 May 2018). 54 The mentioned leader of the ISGS uses claims and grievances from tribes such as the Fulani people (also known as Peul), nomads in the border regions between Mali and Niger, to stake out his political and economic space and accommodate the “fugitives” from the caliphate in Syria and Iraq. 55 In this context, see report by Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, available at: http:// www.ispionline.it/it/articoli/articolo/sicurezzaafrica/scenari-una-nuova-dimensione-del-terrorismoislamista-africa- 14936 (consulted on: 5 May 2018). Revista del Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos n.º 13 - Año: 2019 - Págs.: 181 a 212
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