Revista del Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos n.º 13 - Año: 2019 - Págs.: 213 a 242 227 Ignacio Fuente Cobo Security policies in the Maghreb from the perspective… derstand that, if the balance is broken and one of them is winning, the loser is at the mercy of the stronger, so the incentives to prevent it by the eventual loser are very large. On the other hand, the absence of an international authority to coercively order the anarchy of the system and provide confidence to regional actors, allows Morocco and Algeria to interpret their own measures as defensive and the measures of the other as a potential threat following a spiral model35. The result is that any action taken by one of them aimed at increasing its security – such as increasing its military strength, territorial expansion, or seeking alliances – leads the other to respond with similar measures. When one of them potentially appears to be the winner, the other tends to “compensate” by increasing its own capabilities or forming alliances with other re-gional actors (Tunisia, Mauritania) or extra-regional actors (the United States, France, Spain). This is what realists call offshore balancing36. In these circumstances, balance becomes the most logical behaviour, given that it avoids endangering the security of the system. If the compensatory mechanism is not sufficient to restore balance, this can trigger an increase in tension that could lead to conflict, even if neither party really wants this. The reason is that both Morocco and Algeria consider that any reinforcement of each other’s security policy is motivated, not so much by the need to increase its security, but by its expansive “voracity”37 and they assume that the real motives of their adver-sary are more aggressive than they might have initially thought38. From this subjective perspective, both states mistrust one another to such an extent that their security poli-cies are built on a worst-case scenario of reciprocal intentions. Rather than identifying with each other’s security problems, Morocco and Algeria have a self-centred vision of their security that makes them indifferent to each other’s problems. Thus, the policies of Morocco and Algeria aimed at satisfying their security needs tend, paradoxically, to produce growing insecurity. It could also happen that a secondary regional actor (Mauritania, Tunisia, Libya) views the eventual triumph of one of the two powers, Morocco or Algeria, to be in-evitable and prefers to sit on the fence (for example, Mauritania with respect to Mo-rocco until 1979 during the war in the Sahara against the Polisario Front), rather than building new coalitions aimed at preventing anyone from rising as a winner. In these circumstances, bandwagoning becomes the main and most sensible behaviour of the 35 JERVIS, R. (1976). Perception and Misperception in International Relations, New Jersey, Princeton University Press. Pp.167–174. Also JERVIS, R. (1978). Cooperation under the Security Dilemma, World Politics Vol.30, 2, pp.58–113. 36 MEARSHEIMER (2014). Op.Cit. pp.235-266. 37 GLASER, Ch. (1997). The Security Dilemma Revisited, World Politics, Vol.50, 1, 171-201, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp.178. 38 SNYDER, G. (1984). The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics, World Politics, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. pp. 468-70.
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