230 Journal of the Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies Núm. 13 / 2019 consolidate its occupation of the Western Sahara and Algeria needed to bring an end to the civil war against the terrorist insurgency of the Islamic Front of Salvation (FIS). As a regional integration project, the AMU could not function as long as the regional states that formed it, mainly Morocco and Algeria, did not have sufficiently strong common interests to favour their membership and both questioned the balance of power seeking to increase their relative power. If they had truly been seeking their own security based on cooperation, it would have been enough for them to renounce territorial expansion and accept a certain parity in military capabilities that would guarantee the maintenance of the status quo. model of regional security based on cooperation would require both Morocco and Al-geria to make mutual concessions to correct the exaggerated feeling of insecurity of the other side without risking too much of their own and would have included measures such as unilaterally accepting defensive military doctrines, or modifying the capabili-ties of forces deployed in favour of defensive ones (Glaser, 2002:501), something that neither state was willing to accept. An additional factor is the expansionary attitude of both states which could not be justified by on grounds of security45, but rather the ideological conception of their security policies. Algeria would have achieved its territorial expansion at the time of independence when, by chance of history, France transferred to the Evian Agreements a considerable portion of the Sahara that had never been part of its territory, placing it in an advantageous geopolitical position. For its part, from the end of the protector-ate, Morocco designed a conception of the state based on the idea of “Greater Moroc-co”, which sought to expand its borders to territories that have never belonged to it. For both states avoiding over-expansion and limiting their territorial ambition to Western Sahara is a sign of “strategic common sense”46 since any attempt to dominate the region by force could lead to a painful defeat in the face of a foreseeable coalition of the rest of the states. More than reinforcing security, it is a question of increasing national wealth, regional position, international prestige and strengthening the state through the control of areas or resources outside historical territories. Thus, expanding the area of territorial control would be preferable to opting for the maintenance of the status quo based on cooperation, since it provides both with greater advantages. Even if a mechanism of close cooperation between the two states could be established (such as the failed creation of the Arab Maghreb Union in 1989), neither ac-tor would be willing to cooperate unless it considered the other to be acting similarly47 which, in a climate of mistrust such as the Maghreb, is very difficult to attain. The result is that neither accepts that stability in the Maghreb based on equilibrium should be the ultimate goal of the status quo and both assume that they should use any 45 GLASER (1992). Op.Cit. p. 501. 46 MEARSHEIMER (2014). Op.Cit. p.210. 47 JERVIS (1978). Op.Cit. pp.167-68. Revista del Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos n.º 13 - Año: 2019 - Págs.: 213 a 242
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