Revista del Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos n.º 13 - Año: 2019 - Págs.: 213 a 242 231 Ignacio Fuente Cobo Security policies in the Maghreb from the perspective… opportunity presented to them to modify it for their own benefit. It can be argued that the territorial advantages obtained by Algeria’s independence and the Moroccan aspira-tions contained in its “Greater Morocco” project have created, in a limited regional con-text such as that of the Maghreb, the structural conditions that favour confrontation; in these circumstances the balance of power is not sufficient to curb the aspirations of the two states, since both are revisionist and aspire to regional hegemony48. The only reason neither state has so far achieved hegemony is because both know that, in a situation of balance of power, “the costs of expansion generally outweigh the benefits”49. Only if one of them has a substantial power advantage over the other will it behave more aggressively because it would then have “the ability, as well as the incentive, to do so”50. A further problem arises with the very concept of the status quo, seen as something more than conservation of territory. This would include the defence of interests, the influences on other states and regional alliances, the free access to the resources nec-essary for the country to function, the citizens’ approval of government policies, eco-nomic development, the prestige of the country, and so on. In other words, all those non-territorial aspects that both states see as affecting their own security. If Morocco and Algeria had the same conception of what the status quo means and gave equal importance to all the aspects that make it up, it would be relatively easy to achieve a consensus that favours equilibrium, as discrepancies could be minimised. But when the interests they have to protect are very great and the ideological conceptions on which each state is based are different, it is more difficult for each of them to maintain the status quo, as the security dilemma increases and, with it, the potential for conflict between the two states, which requires greater efforts to maintain the equilibrium. The problem of maintaining the status quo becomes insoluble when one state thinks that guaranteeing its security requires it to threaten or attack the other. When both states, Morocco and Algeria, share this belief, or when each of them thinks that the other favours it, there is a spiral of rearmament in which “whoever stops growing, be-gins to rot”51. The same situation could also arise if one or both states think that, when the other feels completely secure, it will seek to capitalise on its advantageous position by attacking the other’s territory or interests. Managing the security dilemma The security dilemma explains that, in a context of uncertainty, the state finds itself in the worst-case scenario, that is, in a situation where adjacent states may be 48 JORDAN (2013). Op.Cit. p.24. 49 MEARSHEIMER, J (1990). Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War. International Security, Vol. 15, No. 1, p.10. 50 MEARSHEIMER, J (2014). Op.Cit. p.37. 51 ULAM, A. (1968). Expansion and Coexistence, New York, Praeger, p.5.
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