232 Journal of the Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies Núm. 13 / 2019 more powerful than it is; therefore, it tries to increase its power to feel secure. The increase in power of this state increases the insecurity of others who, in turn, increase their power thus giving rise to a cycle of insecurity that can lead to war, even if states do not want to harm each other. As Butterfield states, “the greatest war in history can take place without the intervention of great criminals willing to do harm deliberately: it could be produced between two powers that are desperately anxious to avoid any kind of conflict”52. It is the uncertainty and anxiety about one’s neighbours’ inten-tions that Herz regards as the simple instinct of self-preservation53 which produces the vicious circle of the security dilemma and leads states into competition for greater power. For his part, Jervis, the author who has made the greatest contribution by intro-ducing the security dilemma into the doctrinal body of international relations theory, indicates that the dilemma occurs in the anarchic context of international relations, when “the means by which a state attempts to increase its security reduces the secu-rity of others”54. Although the term “means” tends to refer to the ability of a state to carry out military missions rather than the size of its Armed Forces55, the logic of the security dilemma is much broader and includes the decision to expand territorially or to form or participate in alliances56. The logic of the security dilemma thus explains why reinforcing security policy in the case of one of these states can be provocative for the other. The advantages that one state acquires by arming or expanding can be counterproductive, since if one state becomes too strong and, therefore, more difficult to dissuade, the other one feels more insecure, which provokes it to react, thus leading to a decrease in the security of the state that is rearming or expanding 57. On the other hand, if one state is too weak it may assume “great dangers” with regard to the other, if the latter has aggressive in-tentions58. The consequence would be a process of action and reaction along the lines of what Glaser calls the “spiral model”, a process of progressive deterioration, which translates into a situation of growing tension between the two states as the product of a self-enforcing mechanism59. 52 BUTTERFIELD (1951), Herbert. History and Human Relations, New York, Collings. Pp.19-22. 53 HERZ, J (1951). Political Realism and Political Idealism, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, p.157. 54 JERVIS (1978). Op.Cit. p.169. 55 SNYDER, G. (1996). Process Variables in Neorealist Theory, Security Studies, 5, 180-183. Oxford, Routledge, pp.180-183. 56 GLASER, Ch. (1997). Op.Cit. Pp.175. 57 GLASER, Ch. (1997). Op.Cit. Pp.174. 58 JERVIS (1976). Op.Cit. P.58. 59 TANG, S (2009). The Security Dilemma: A Conceptual Analysis, Security Studies, Vol. 18, 3, p.616. Revista del Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos n.º 13 - Año: 2019 - Págs.: 213 a 242
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