Journal of the Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies Núm. 13 / 2019 Revista del Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos n.º 13 - Año: 2019 - Págs.: 307 a 328 320320 the principle of equality regulated in Article 1 of the Spanish Constitution, as well as of Article 9.2 of this regulatory text, with the aim of recalling that it corresponds to the public authorities to promote conditions such that the freedom and equality of individuals and of such groups as they may belong to be real and effective. Following this, it is emphasized that the right to equality is recognized in in Article 14 of Chapter II, Title I, of the said Constitutional text. This being so, and following the central line of thought centered on the limit of reference to the equality of parties and to effective judicial protection during the judicial process as set forth in Article 24 of the Spanish Constitution, emphasis is placed on the Constitutional nature of these, given that, as fundamental rights, they are especially protected by means of recourse to appeal on the grounds of unconstitutionality. As the author argues, “(…) the equality of the parties in judicial processes stems from the more general principal of equality before the Law”. Both questions have been addressed extensively on the part of the doctrine which sees greater judicial security in face of the possibility that “Equality of arms between the parties, within the sphere of procedural action, is included in natural-judicial principles”. In this regard, it is emphasized that in order to define a concept on the equality of the parties to judi-cial processes “(…) it is a prerequisite to begin from the principle of equality linked to contentious processes, where the principal interested parties to the process (i.e., the parties) must be treated with impartiality, that is to say, that all of the litigants must have the same opportunities of action during the process, with none standing in a situation of inferiority; in spite of which, it should be emphasized that the situation at the outset is not identical. The acting party, initially, is in an objectively more favorable position than is the other party, but only at the outset, given that the dynamic must change once the process is under-way, to become a homogeneous situation”. From the analysis carried out, it is concluded that the protected judicial interest of limit is intended to guarantee, on the one hand, the equality of the parties to the judicial process and on the other, to guarantee as well the fundamental right to effective judicial supervision, both recognized by the Constitution. VIII The principal thesis upon which Nuria Romero Santiago expounds in Chapter VIII is the analysis of “The administrative functions of vigilance, inspection and control”, as limit on the right of access to public information regulated in Article 14.1.g) of the LTRAPIGG. Beyond a doubt, the difficulty of this analysis lies in de-fining the material content of the said judicial concepts. According to the author, the true judicial interest protected in this principal is to be found fundamentally in the confidential nature of sensitive information. Due to this, “It is intended to protect and guarantee the confidentiality of information relevant to methods, specific locations and the limits to the intervention of those specific services, to the end that inefficiency be avoided, as well as to avoid invalidation of any act or official document which may have been issued”.
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