A N A L Y S I S
support of the non-proliferation and disarmament architecture.In
January of this year, the Initiative countries met at the highest level
and approved a roadmap for the coming months. Spain has offered
to hold a meeting in Madrid in late spring or early summer to take
stock and coordinate the actions to be carried out in the final stretch
prior to the NPT Review Conference scheduled for August. At this
Conference, the Member States will negotiate new measures
contributing to achieving a world without nuclear weapons under an
international monitoring regime.
Also last January, on the 22nd, the Treaty on the Prohibition
of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) entered into force. Unlike the NPT,
this Treaty does prohibit the signatory countries from developing,
producing, buying or using nuclear weapons. However, its entry
into force is symbolic since, despite its ratification, the main
atomic powers in the world are not signatories of the text. To
this must be added that the Atlantic Alliance —with no fault lines
among its member states— opposes the document for four
main reasons: it considers that the Treaty lacks any rigorous
or clear monitoring mechanism; it has not been signed by any
state that has nuclear weapons; it does not reflect the challenges
faced by the international security environment; and it threatens
to undermine the global non-proliferation and disarmament
architecture that upholds the NPT as the only credible path to
nuclear disarmament.
THE SPANISH POSITION
Spain has reiterated its commitment to multilateralism, which is
one of the pillars of Spanish foreign policy. Our goal, as stated in
the National Security Strategy (2017), is to “prevent proliferation,
impede terrorists or criminals from gaining access to dangerous
substances, and protect the population”. In addition, Spain
promotes and strengthens compliance with the commitments,
NOT JUST BOMBS
THREE elements must be considered in nuclear deterrence. In
addition to the nuclear warheads themselves, the platforms
from which they can be launched are equally important, as
well as the vectors —usually missiles— that carry them to their
target. In fact, this is one of the American —and, indirectly, Israeli—
complaints regarding the Iran nuclear deal (Joint Comprehensive
Plan of Action, or JCPOA):
we must consider not only
the uranium-enrichment
capacity and weaponsmanufacturing
technology,
but missiles and their
capabilities also should be
included among the limi-
tations that are imposed.
Within the platforms, we
again find a second triad
that increases attackers’
resilience and, therefore,
their real possibilities of
action. Having the ability
to launch one’s missiles
from silos on land, from
airplanes in flight, or from
ships —or, better yet, submarines— ensures the survival of enough
warheads against a surprise attack. It is the balance of opportunity
between offense and defense that keeps deterrence alive, the
fundamental raison d’être of nuclear weapons.
This balance was once threatened by the famous “Star
Wars” project, which the then-President Reagan threatened to
put into orbit to create an impenetrable shield that would render
the Soviet arsenal useless. Other efforts in this regard, this time
contemporary, are the Aegis combat system or the THAAD
(Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) that the United States has
deployed, for example, in South Korea.
The response of the attacking party was introduced by highperformance
missiles. Hypersonic missiles such as HGVs
(Hypersonic Glide Vehicles),
or HCMs (Hypersonic
Cruise Missiles). Both
normally exceed speeds
five times the speed of
sound. At that speed, these
missiles often contribute
enormous precision and
maneuverability that make
them very difficult to detect
and intercept.
The great powers have
already begun a race to
develop these vectors.
The Russian Federation
has the RS-28 Sarmat
system in place (also
known as Satan II), a
EFE
cruise missile that could host up to 24 HGV-type warheads. The
American replica is the Tactical Boost Glide (TBG), a vehicle that
uses rockets to propel itself to great heights and speeds before
gliding to its target. As for hypersonic cruise missiles, Russia has
commissioned the Kinzhal (Dagger), while the Pentagon has the
HAWC. China and other countries are also developing their own
hypersonic vectors.
54 Revista Española de Defensa April 2021