340 Journal of the Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies N. 5 / 2015 Chinese interest in assuring peace and stability in the surrounding area is a necessary condition for its economic development and maintaining the Communist Party in power. We must ask ourselves why Beijing would risk generating distrust in the neighbouring States, propitiating the creation of a coalition of “counterbalance”, a situation it attempted to avoid through its Asian strategy formulated from 1997 onwards8. Concern in Asia at China’s behaviour was reflected in a series of movements contrary to the interests of Beijing in the long term: changes in Japanese security policy; the strategic association of Japan with India and Australia (and that of these latter two); the growing unity of the ASEAN bloc with regard to the PRC; the proliferation of bilateral security agreements between intermediary powers and the reinforcement of the role of the United States, whose protection is desired by numerous States in the region. In spite of such hedging in the face of its rise, China not only maintains the rhetoric of good relations with its neighbours,9 but it has set in train a diplomatic strategy that includes an ambitious agenda for economic cooperation, the development of connectivity infrastructures and even a regional collective security scheme. In November 2014, on the occasion of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Beijing, China hit a more pragmatic note and renewed dialogue with Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines, signing up to various bilateral agreements with the United States.10 The desire to reduce the tension of the two previous years could explain such conciliatory rhetoric, centred on friendship and shared interests with its neighbours.11 Notwithstanding, neither Beijing appears to have abandoned its objectives -to reconfigure its immediate environment and assure core interests-, nor has regional concern over Chinese capabilities and intentions disappeared. Closer examination of Chinese foreign policy over the past two years reveals how its periphery has been prioritised, becoming the axis of a new strategic focus which, while still maintaining a degree of continuity, represents a departure from the 8 DELAGE, Fernando. La República Popular China y la reconfiguración del orden asiático (1997- 2005), Madrid: Universidad Complutense E-Prints, 2013, http://eprints.ucm.es/24641/1/T35175.pdf 9 “Xi Jinping: China to Further Friendly Relations with Neighboring Countries”, Xinhua, 26 October 2013, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-10/26/c_125601680.htm (last consultation 12-1-2015). 10 COSSA, Ralph y GLOSSERMAN, Brad. “A tale of two tales: competing narratives in the Asia Pacific”, PacNet no. 84, Pacific Forum CSIS, 1 December 2014, http://csis.org/files/publication/ Pac1484.pdf (last consultation 4-12-2014). 11 MITCHELL, Tom y PILLING, David. “Xi Jinping tones down foreign policy rhetoric”, Financial Times, 1 December 2014, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/b95a3730-792f-11e4-a57d-00144feabdc0. html#axzz3Kjlh8FZe. (last consultation 2-12-2014). http://revista.ieee.es/index.php/ieee
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