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REVISTA IEEE 5

399 Alejandra Álvarez Suárez The collapse of order... may acquire in the fight for those territories (a matter which is not considered of interest in this study) this symbolic actions reflect a discomfort and a Sunni claim that date back at a concrete time in Contemporary and Modern History in that region. The war in Syrian which began as a social protest against the regime3 it has been used subsequently by a well identified faction that defends faith-based vindications as well as for those who aim to maintain the status quo by all means. Both sides diverted the meaning of clash by transmuting its political and social meaning into a fight for confessional ascription. This cannot however be properly interpreted if we simply retreat to a distant period of Islamic history, such as the origins of the struggle between Shiites and Sunnis.4 When making a socio-religious map of the region, even if in detailed, it might not clarify much in this respect.5 Precisely for that reason, in this article I will reflect hindsight, it is therefore articulated in three landmarks or milestones that can help us better understand the current complicated situation and determine if religion is an essential part of the conflict; or, on the contrary, if it has been used by different parties as mere political and social upheaval instrument. I will also show some elements that can be currently considered characteristic in the political and social situation and which have also been present for more than a century. A look at recent history also allow us to identify specific demands and frustrations of conservative sunna are: the return to a situation in which Islam was traditionally dominant regarding social confession and religion, and the end of the Western influence , manifested in different episodes which contemporary Syria.6 Has elapsed. 3  Recall that the two main slogans that were heard in the first demonstrations against the regime, during March 2011 were: “No religious sectarianism” (lālit-tayfiyye), and “the Syrian people are one“ (aš-Sahb as-sūrīwāhid). These references have disappeared from the Syrian scene to make way for some, like “Alawites to the coffin and Christians to Beirut “(il-calāwīcat-tābūtul-msīhīca-Bayrūt). Furthermore, the initial or hurriyya u-bass! (“Freedom and Enough!”) Has given way to new variants in which you play with the components of Allah enumeration, Suriya, Hurriyya SC u-bass (“God, Syria, Freedom and enough” ), as ideology who utters it. The circumstances that led to the protest in Syria, cf. FouadAjami, The Syrian Rebellion, Stanford: Hoover Institution Stanford University, 69-82. 4  I mean the struggle to control the power of the caliphate that took place in the seventh century among different Muslim factions and led later to the sunna and the SICA (Cf Encyclopaedia of Islam, Leiden. Brill 1986, I, 382-386. This is a story that while it may be brought to bear on different analysis, those are still distant events, even for Muslims themselves. Moreover, it begins to be questioned in any published work by several historians Cf. Patricia Crone and Michael Cook, Hagarism The Making of the Islamic Word, Cambridge. CambridgeUniv. Press 1977. 5  See in this regard the description presented in my thesis: Alejandra Alvarez Suarez, non-Muslim communities in a Muslim environment. The survival of Ottoman Syria in the current model, Madrid: Cantarabia 2012, 7-53 and Id & Francisco River, “popular The current Syrian view of the Jews “ The Levantine Review 2/2 (2013 ), 108-109. 6  A recent analysis on Modern and Contemporary History of Syria from a more general perspective, http://revista.ieee.es/index.php/ieee


REVISTA IEEE 5
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