359 Fernando Delage The Asian strategy of Xi Jinping relations with the States of its periphery. While its focus abroad has been concentrated on Asia since the nineties, it currently extends in all directions, and also includes Central and South Asia. In spite of its capabilities, China cannot realise its objectives if it faces continued opposition from its neighbours. Its principal challenge is therefore to devise a strategy, which, apart from allowing it to progress in achieving its core interests, pursues a positive long-term relationship with the surrounding nations. Xi Jinping’s response has consisted in looking for convergence between the interests of the periphery and the rise of China. For Beijing to gain credibility it needs to reduce regional concerns over its intentions. In response it has come up with the proposal to create a new security architecture, based on cooperation. To the same end of presenting itself as a responsible major power, Beijing’s message to the Asian States is that they can benefit from Chinese growth, with the development of a web of integration networks. Together with a firmer stance on territorial claims, this is another core element of its new Asian strategy. With proposals for three economic corridors (the Silk Road with Central Asia, the Maritime Silk Route with Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean, and BCIM, with Bangladesh, India, Myanmar -with the extension of the bilateral corridor with Pakistan- in southern Asia), Beijing aspires to promoting connectivity with these three sub regions, creating the basis for a more integrated Asia, with China at the centre.71 This structure of economic and security incentives would strengthen dependence on the PRC, making difficult any future confrontation with Beijing.72 China would thus regain the leadership position that it held in Asia towards the middle of the 19th century, establishing a new regional hierarchy in which its status would be recognised by the neighbouring countries. Thirdly, this strategy incorporates the ambition to build a regional order incompatible with a preeminent position for the United States. The Chinese government has no 71 In the case of northeastern Asia, although it would appear that China intends to minimise Japan’s role in the region, the Korean peninsula also forms part of its strategy of integration, as was explicitly stated in July 2014: “President Xi Jinping Delivers an Important Speech in ROK’s Seoul National University, Stressing that China Will Always Be a Country that Maintains Peace, Promotes Cooperation and is Modest to Learn from Others, and that China Will Create the Future of China- ROK Cooperation and Accomplish Asia’s Revitalization and Prosperity Together with ROK”, Seoul, 4 July 2014, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/xjpzxdhgjxgsfw/t1172436.shtml (last consultation 16-1-2015). See also HAN Sukhee. “China’s Charm Offensive to Korea: A New Approach to Extend the Strategic Buffer”, The Asan Forum, 13 June 2014, http://www.theasanforum.org/chinas-charm- offensive-to-korea-a-new-approach-to-extend-the-strategic-buffer/ (last consultation 16-1- 2015). 72 GLASER, Bonnie and PAL, Deep. “Is China’s Charm Offensive Dead?”, China Brief, vol. XIV, no. 15, 31 July 2014, p. 12, http://www.jamestown.org/regions/chinaasiapacific/single/?tx_ ttnewstt_news=42691&tx_ttnewsbackPid=663&cHash=21bdb777141a8e186c39f423fdaa4ec2#. VFNhL2eeuSo (last consultation 16-1-2015). http://revista.ieee.es/index.php/ieee
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