391 José Díaz Toribio Moving through a european defence landscape... for the assessment of capabilities and the management and rationalisation of resources. 5. We should also monitor the progress of the proposals made by the Commission in relation to the following areas: 5.1. Certification and standardisation (what will be the implications for Spanish industry; what type of activities does it affect; what opportunities does it offer for cooperation with third countries and the establishment of new trade associations; how can these processes be combined with participation in other non-European projects and acquisitions of interest to Spain). 5.2. In relation to the development of the business model that the Commission is giving shape to (according to its desires or possibilities): assess what Spain’s options are in relation to its competitors and clients. 5.3. Assess what compensation systems can be requested of the EU in the event that the aforementioned processes harm some of our fundamental interests. However, the opportunities that the European defence policy has to offer Spain should also be assessed in light of their limitations (what it cannot offer us) and their ambiguities (which prevent the resolution of certain issues that would allow the development of the mechanisms provided for in the Treaty of Lisbon and therefore blur its outlines). At both ends the scale, the historical description we presented at the start of this article will help us to understand its shortfalls. We have seen how after the European Council of December 2013, the EU (which at the strategic level has come to a standpoint)55 offers us a framework for the development of capabilities in a cooperative manner and afforded us the opportunity to - at least partly - enhance the efficiency of our defence industry. However, some needs have not been met: • Key issues, such as the development of capabilities (missile defence and others). Spain is more interested in being involved in NATO projects, which cannot be linked to the CSDP. We can also cite projects in the transatlantic framework that are essential for interoperability. • In terms of procurement policy, P & S projects are as yet unable to meet all our http://revista.ieee.es/index.php/ieee supply needs. 55 Despite the request of some countries, the European security strategy was not amended; the “Maritime Security Strategy”, which was eventually approved in 2014, is the outcome of four years’ work, while the “framework” for addressing cyberthreats, also approved in 2014, primarily aims to protect European systems and guide Member States.
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