404 Journal of the Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies N. 5 / 2015 too different from the one used by British in their Mandate21 was developed in three directions: 1) by creating self-governing territories according to faith-based criteria, 2) by favoring non Sunni minorities collaborations and 3) by creating an statute that would equal all citizens regardless their religion. As we will later understand the consequences of those actions will be envisage nowadays due to the fact that the new Syrian State that was created in 1946 inherits , in large part, the French order. When explaining French politics within Syria and Lebanon we need to take into consideration the fact that head of states faced two determinant factors: a preconceived idea of the territory and the population, and the previous experience they had in Africa. On one side French were totally convinced that they would be well received by Levantines,22 but they encountered the Arab nationalist’s opposition. Besides they applied their colonial experience in northern Africa, which in religious and social terms, this experience was quite different.23 The Syria-Lebanon society under the French perspective was mainly divided according to faith -based criteria (a Middle East idea that is still stated by western analysts). Sunni group which is the largest confessional one within the Syrian territory (the French were reluctant towards prior to the arrival),24 were classified almost as a nationalistic compact block and due to that fact they were the Mandate opponents while other religions would be likely to swing in this regard. The most important initiative to conspire this “Sunni nationalism” was to divide the territory in confessional states according to the Ottoman administrative reorganization order in 1864.25 French counted on three main goals: strengthening all 21 Cf. David Kenneth Fieldhouse, Western Imperialism in the Middle East 1914-1958, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2006, 258-259. I have already addressed the French religious policy during the Mandate in two publications: cf. Alejandra Álvarez Suárez, Non-Mulsim communities in a Muslim environment. The survival of the Ottoman model in today´s Syria. , Madrid: Cantarabia 2012, 158- 182, and more summarized Id. “Confesionalism and Modernity: The origins of the Syrian paradox”, Awraq 8 (2013), 94-98. 22 Despising the survey data of American King-Crane Commission of 1919. Full text in “King- Crane report ont heNear East”, Editor & PublisherCo. 55, nº. 27, 2º Sección, 2 de diciembre de 1922, XVIII + map. Cf. James L. Gelvin, “The Ironic Legacy of the King-Crane Comission”, The Middle East and the United States: a historical and political reassessment (Lesch, David W., ed.), Boulder: Westview Press 2007, 13-29. 23 Cf. David Kenneth Fieldhouse, Western Imperialism in the Middle East 1914-1958, Oxford: OxfordUniv. Press 2006, 253-254 y 257-258. 24 Cf. Daniel Pipes, Greater Syria. The History of an Ambition, Oxford: OxfordUniv. Press 1992, 153. 25 Cf. George Young (ed.), Corps de Droit Ottoman. Recueil des Codes, Lois, Règlements, Ordonnances et Actes les plus importants du Droit Intérieur, et d’Études sur le Droit Coutumier de l’Empire Ottoman, http://revista.ieee.es/index.php/ieee
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