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REVISTA IEEE 3

315 Ángel Gómez de Ágreda Climate Change in the Arctic: Beyond the North Pole so many other areas, will be conditioned by budgetary constraints and prioritisation as laid down by the Kremlin. Other alternative scenarios could include a lesser involvement of state initiative in the development of the interior regions connected by inland waterways with the major seaports that should be established along the Arctic Coast and greater input from private initiative. This could come from investors interested in getting the first slice of the cake from Siberian resources, above all in sectors linked with infrastructures or customer service areas of emerging communities. Nevertheless, it is also probable that third countries -China in particular- could decide to obtain concessions on minerals or energy resources in exchange for the construction of infrastructures (similar to the model employed in Africa) in a region which is closer and thus less vulnerable than the South African continent or South America. Added to the tremendous imbalance between the rates of population density in Siberia and China (3 inhabitants per square kilometre as compared with 143) is the Chinese capacity for investment and the huge appetite demonstrated by its industry to satisfy an ever-increasing international demand. The connection of its resources and factories via inland terrestrial routes or coastal fleets would reinforce the offshoring trend of many large companies towards Asia. Nevertheless, the same investment and manpower that could turn the tide of the tendency towards stagnation and the decline of Siberia could become a top-priority geopolitical challenge, more compelling even than that of the present-day Chinese penetration in the ex-Soviet republics of Central Asia. Moscow’s apparent reservations in its dealings with the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO)29 and its constant attempt to counteract the leadership that China wields in this area with the fomentation of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO)30 in the so-called “-stans” underline the Kremlin’s sensitivity towards its loss of protagonism in its southern and eastern flanks. A resolution to this difficult situation between the major Asian powers is rendered even more complicated in view of China’s increasing assertiveness in its foreign relations. The urgent need for one or other regime to resolve internal conflicts could even give rise to situations of tension that could ultimately prove damaging to both parties. 29  The official page of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation can be consulted at: http://www. sectsco.org/ 30  The official page of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation can be consulted at: http://www. odkb.gov.ru/start/index_aengl.htm


REVISTA IEEE 3
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