330 Journal of the Spanisch Institute for Strategic Studies N. 3 / 2014 all of the mentioned requirements are fulfilled, together with the decision that the permanent members of the Council would commit to renouncing their right of veto in these cases. The panel did not, however, raise the possibility of other alternatives, unlike the ICISS17. C) The outcome document approved by the Heads of State and Government participating in the Millennium Summit followed the more conservative lead of the report presented to them by the Secretary-General (2005). It accepted the existence of the RtoP but considered the Security Council, in its existing formation and decision-taking procedures – once again the right of veto – as being the only legitimate authority to decide on armed intervention in application of the concept of the RtoP18. Ultimately, we are inclined to reject the claim that positive international law may allow the use of force on humanitarian grounds, even in the situations that the RtoP addresses, without prior authorisation from the Council. This would require that none of the five permanent members had used their right of veto. From this point of view, we regret how there appears to be an adjustment to reality from the side of those who consider that the concept of the RtoP – which hasn’t been accepted in a generalised way as a new exception to the prohibition on the use of armed force in international relations – only “reflects an evolution in the way in which the Security Council evaluates or considers its powers according to articles 39 to 24 of the Charter”19. The suggestion would seem to be that the concept of the RtoP would justify, per se, implementing coercive measures by the Council, including those that would imply a use of military force, beyond the requirement of a prior and perceptive formal declaration, ex article 39 of the Charter, that “a threat or breach of peace” has occurred. And this, incidentally, without the existence of any rule for obligation in this regard. It should also be noted that where the Council is blocked by the use of veto – when the RtoP parameters analysed above are fulfilled –, certain rules are rendered useless; rules that are generally accepted today and that protect the vital interests of the international community as a whole. Rules such as those banning genocide, committing war crimes or crimes against humanity, or the mass violation of human rights. We will come back to this point in the conclusion of this paper. 17 A more secure world…(A/59/565) cit., p. 68 (para. 256). . 18 Outcome Document… cit., p. 33 (para. 138-139). For a more detailed analysis of the concept of the RtoP in the Reports quoted and in the Outcome Document vid. ad ex. GUTIÉRREZ ESPADA, C.: “The ‘use of force’ in the reports of the High Level Panel (2004), the Secretary-General (2005) and finally in the Summit of Heads of State and Government Outcome Document (United Nations, New York, September 2005)”, in Anuario de Derecho Internacional, XXI (2005), p. 13-49 (p. 39-49). 19 Case of Professor James CRAWFORD: Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012 (8th ed.), p. 756.
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