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332 Journal of the Spanisch Institute for Strategic Studies N. 3 / 2014 the resolution by the parties to the conflict. Instead, it limits itself to using the standard formula once again23. The opinion we staunchly defend in this paper24 regarding the inaction from the side of the Council in the case of Syria is also the opinion that has been clearly voiced by the Member States at the United Nations: A) Through declarations, such as the ones made by the representation of Germany on the occasion of the debate in the General Assembly on the Security Council’s report 2012-2013. They considered that the vetoes of the draft resolution on Syria raise a question mark as to the relevance of the Council and added that the French proposal for self-regulation of the right of veto and the renunciation thereof in the case of mass crimes should be studied at a later date. In a similar vein, the Maldives penned a petition at the UN calling for a ban on the right of veto in situations where the Council is facing mass crimes. The representative of the Maldives added that if Member States are not capable of protecting their citizens, it is down to the United Nations to take on this responsibility25. B) Also through actions, as demonstrated by Saudi Arabia who, having been elected as a non-permanent member of the Council, resigned the following day, alluding to the body’s incapability to face up to its responsibilities to world peace, and citing explicitly the text circulated by the national news agency SPA on the (in) action in the civil war in Syria26. The General Assembly elected Jordan as a substitute for Saudi Arabia on the 6 December 2013. The United Nations News Centre expressly stressed that the representatives of Saudi Arabia justified their country’s resignation in categorical terms: “due to not being in agreement with the actions of the Council regarding the situation in Syria…”27. 23  “Decides, in the event of non-compliance with this resolution, including unauthorized transfer of chemical weapons, or any use of chemical weapons by anyone in the Syrian Arab Republic, to impose measures under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter”, S/RES/2118 (2013), para. 21. 24  Most bibliographical opinion appears to share this view: vid. ad ex. PONS, RAFOLS, X.: “Naciones Unidas y Siria: idea y realidad”, ANUE (magazine of the United Nations Association of Spain), n°. 43, May 2012, pp. 5-14; ANDRÉS SÁENZ DE SANTAMARÍA, P.: “Las Naciones Unidas ante el conflicto de Siria”, Opinion Document, 93/2012, 18 December 2012, pp. 1-15 Available under: http://www.ieee.es); WECKEL, PH.: “Crise en Syrie, la relance du processus politique”, Sentinelle, bulletin 348 of 19 May 2013, pp. 1-12 (and 18 other contributions from Professor Weckel on the subject over the past two years are quoted on pp. 11-12, 2011-2013) (www.sentinelle-droit-international. fr); BERMEJO GARCIA, R.: “La responsabilidad de proteger y el Derecho internacional: ¿mito o realidad en la práctica internacional? cit.”, pp. 203-209. 25  Vid. BRUSIL MIRANDA, M.: “L’ Assemblée générale critique les méthodes de travail et le fonctionnement du Conseil de Sécurité”, Sentinelle, bulletin n°. 368, 1 December 2013, pp. 1-7 (p. 6). 26  www.internacional.elpais.com, Ángeles Espinosa, 18 October 2013 (Consulted 30 October). 27  www.un.org, UN News Centre, consulted 9 December 2013.


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